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Update documentation to tally with recent changes
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
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@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt(
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
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* \p alg is not supported.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* Failed to allocate memory for key material
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*/
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@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(
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* * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
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* \p alg is not supported.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* Failed to allocate memory for key material
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*/
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@ -263,8 +263,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of
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* the library.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* (GCM and CCM only) Unable to allocate buffer for nonce.
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*/
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(
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mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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@ -289,7 +287,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(
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* - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
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* - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling
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* this function is not required.
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* - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation.
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*
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* If this function returns an error status, the PSA core calls
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* mbedtls_psa_aead_abort().
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@ -341,9 +338,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths(
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* to undo any action that depends on the input if
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* mbedtls_psa_aead_verify() returns an error status.
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*
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* \note For the time being #PSA_ALG_CCM and #PSA_ALG_GCM require the entire
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* additional data to be passed in in one go, i.e.
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* mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() can only be called once.
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*
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* \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
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* \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of
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@ -352,12 +346,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths(
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* Success.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total input length overflows the additional data length that
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* was previously specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* (For GCM / CCM) PSA core attempted to call mbedtls_psa_update_ad()
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* more than once.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of
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* the library.
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@ -392,10 +380,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad(
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* mbedtls_psa_aead_verify() provides sufficient input. The amount of data that
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* can be delayed in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE.
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*
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* \note For the time being #PSA_ALG_CCM and #PSA_ALG_GCM require the entire
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* data to be passed in in one go, i.e. mbedtls_psa_aead_update() can only
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* be called once.
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*
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* \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
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* \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to
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* encrypt or decrypt.
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@ -425,19 +409,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad(
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* #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or
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* #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to
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* determine the required buffer size.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total length of input to mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
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* less than the additional data length that was previously
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* specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total input length overflows the plaintext length that
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* was previously specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* (GCM / CCM only) PSA core attempted to call mbedtls_psa_update() more
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* than once.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* (CCM only) Unable to allocate memory for the tag or the body
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*/
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
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mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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@ -505,9 +476,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* Success.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
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* The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption
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* operation with a nonce set).
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
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* The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small.
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* #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
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@ -515,14 +483,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
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* required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type,
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* \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to
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* determine the required \p tag buffer size.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total length of input to mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
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* less than the additional data length that was previously
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* specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total length of input to mbedtls_psa_aead_update() so far is
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* less than the plaintext length that was previously
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* specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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*/
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish(
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mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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@ -590,24 +550,11 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish(
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
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* The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is
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* not correct.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
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* The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption
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* operation with a nonce set).
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
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* The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small.
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* #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
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* #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the
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* required buffer size.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total length of input to mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
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* less than the additional data length that was previously
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* specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* The total length of input to mbedtls_psa_aead_update() so far is
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* less than the plaintext length that was previously
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* specified with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths().
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* (CCM only) Failed to allocate temporary buffer
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*/
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_verify(
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mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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