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Improve robustness of ECDH public key length validation
In client-side code with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, use the buffer size to validate what is written in handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey. The previous code was correct, but a little fragile to misconfiguration or maintenance. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
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@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
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}
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if (ecpoint_len > PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) {
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if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
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}
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@ -2059,7 +2059,7 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q,
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MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen,
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ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
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MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH);
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sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey));
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret);
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