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Rename badmac_seen to badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen

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Prepare to unify two fields of the `mbedtls_ssl_context` structure:
`badmac_seen` (always present but only used in DTLS) and
`in_hsfraglen` (always present but only used in non-DTLS TLS).

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2025-02-17 16:10:14 +01:00
parent 69f8f45e6f
commit f6a676d93f
3 changed files with 15 additions and 6 deletions
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11
include/mbedtls/ssl.h
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@ -1724,7 +1724,16 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state); int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
#endif #endif
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ /** Multipurpose field.
*
* - DTLS: records with a bad MAC received.
* - TLS: accumulated length of handshake fragments (up to ::in_hslen).
*
* This field is multipurpose in order to preserve the ABI in the
* Mbed TLS 3.6 LTS branch. Until 3.6.2, it was only used in DTLS
* and called `badmac_seen`.
*/
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */

4
library/ssl_msg.c
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@ -5033,8 +5033,8 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
} }
if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0) { if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0) {
++ssl->badmac_seen; ++ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen;
if (ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) { if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
} }

6
library/ssl_tls.c
View File

@ -5021,7 +5021,7 @@ static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = {
* uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value
* uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use
* // fields from ssl_context * // fields from ssl_context
* uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC * uint32 badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
* uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num
* uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection
* uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram
@ -5163,7 +5163,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*/ */
used += 4; used += 4;
if (used <= buf_len) { if (used <= buf_len) {
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen, p, 0);
p += 4; p += 4;
} }
@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
} }
ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
p += 4; p += 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)