Move the suite's global dependency on MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C to the
individual test cases.
Add an preprocesor guard around string_debug to prevent warning about unused
functions.
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
Reassemble handshake fragments incrementally instead of all at the end. That
is, every time we receive a non-initial handshake fragment, append it to the
initial fragment. Since we only have to deal with at most two handshake
fragments at the same time, this simplifies the code (no re-parsing of a
record) and is a little more memory-efficient (no need to store one record
header per record).
This commit also fixes a bug. The previous code did not calculate offsets
correctly when records use an explicit IV, which is the case in TLS 1.2 with
CBC (encrypt-then-MAC or not), GCM and CCM encryption (i.e. all but null and
ChachaPoly). This led to the wrong data when an encrypted handshake message
was fragmented (Finished or renegotiation). The new code handles this
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Pre-existing but not having TLS 1.3 in the build does not seem to be
necessary actually. These test functions set the dtls flag when
calling `test_resize_buffers` and then `test_resize_buffers` sets the
`options.dtls` flag which eventually forces the TLS 1.2 version of the
protocol (in `mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init()` call of
`mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()` with `MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM`
as the transport).
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Only RSA cipgersuits are accepted for these tests and there is no ECDHE-RSA
alternative for AES-128-CCM so delete them.
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
The README file content dates back to the early stages of PSASIM
development. Since then a lot of things have changed, so the README
file required a complete rewrite.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
Replace `tests/opt-testcases/handshake-manual.sh` by
`tests/opt-testcases/handshake-generated.sh`. They are identical except for
comments.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Be more uniform in where certificate authentication and ECDSA are explicitly
required. A few test cases now run in PSK-only configurations where they
always could. Add a missing requirement on ECDSA to test cases that are
currently skipped.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
In a TLS client, when using certificate authentication, the client should
check that the certificate is valid for the server name that the client
expects. Otherwise, in most scenarios, a malicious server can impersonate
another server.
Normally, the application code should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname().
However, it's easy to forget. So raise an error if mandatory certificate
authentication is in effect and mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has not been
called. Raise the new error code
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME, for easy
identification.
But don't raise the error if the backward compatibility option
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
No behavior change apart from now emitting a different log message depending
on whether mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called with NULL or not at all.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
