In our tests, we run `tests/scripts/doxygen.sh`, which checks that `doxygen`
runs without warnings after `scripts/config.py realfull`. In this
configuration, alternative implementations such as `MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT` are
enabled, which allows the documentation to contain references to the
`MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT` symbol itself. However, this disables context types that
alternative implementations must define in their header, such as
`mbedtls_rsa_context`. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4518
As a partial fix, allow `tests/scripts/doxygen.sh` to see dummy definitions
of the context type. This way, we can use both `#MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT` and
`#mbedtls_rsa_context` cross-references in our documentation. This is not
ideal, because `doxygen.sh` isn't testing for errors in the documentation of
the affected context types, but it's cheap progress.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit makes the code arguably slightly simpler and fixes the build
with clang -Wimplicit-fallthrough. No intended semantic change.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This isn't officially supported, but it's convenient to build the library
this way for quick testing.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Add code and unit tests for MBEDTLS_PK_ECxxx in
mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes().
This commit only supports built-in ECC (MBEDTLS_ECP_C). A subsequent commit
will handle driver-only ECC.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This avoids a possible gotcha when if the application code reuses an
existing attribute structure.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Use new functions from the RSA module to parse and write
private and public keys in PKCS#1 format.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
This feature was an unofficial extension which was never documented.
Now that we are removing the PK dependency in order to use only
functions from RSA module, PEM support is unavailable. Therefore
we explicitly remove it.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
These functions are meant to be used internally, so their prototype
declaration is kept into rsa_internal.h.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
Upon further consideration we think that a remote attacker close to the
victim might be able to have precise enough timing information to
exploit the side channel as well. Update the Changelog to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
Any timing variance dependant on the output of this function enables a
Bleichenbacher attack. It is extremely difficult to use safely.
In the Marvin attack paper
(https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/marvin-attack-paper.pdf) the
author suggests that implementations of PKCS 1.5 decryption that don't
include a countermeasure should be considered inherently dangerous.
They suggest that all libraries implement the same countermeasure, as
implementing different countermeasures across libraries enables the
Bleichenbacher attack as well.
This is extremely fragile and therefore we don't implement it. The use
of PKCS 1.5 in Mbed TLS implements the countermeasures recommended in
the TLS standard (7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246) and is not vulnerable.
Add a warning to PKCS 1.5 decryption to warn users about this.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
The initializatio macros need to be updated to support the case
where the crypto client view of the structures is being initialized
Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis <antonio.deangelis@arm.com>
