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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

patch: update to v2.8

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Delete patches already upstream.

Signed-off-by: Russell Senior <russell@personaltelco.net>
This commit is contained in:
Russell Senior 2025-04-02 05:57:34 -07:00 committed by Josef Schlehofer
parent 8efe42d86c
commit f17c283cda
6 changed files with 3 additions and 375 deletions
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6
devel/patch/Makefile
View File

@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=patch
PKG_VERSION:=2.7.6
PKG_RELEASE:=7
PKG_VERSION:=2.8
PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@GNU/patch
PKG_HASH:=ac610bda97abe0d9f6b7c963255a11dcb196c25e337c61f94e4778d632f1d8fd
PKG_HASH:=f87cee69eec2b4fcbf60a396b030ad6aa3415f192aa5f7ee84cad5e11f7f5ae3
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-3.0-or-later
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING

24
devel/patch/patches/010-CVE-2018-6951.patch
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@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
From 9bf998b5fcbcde1dea0e472dc1538abb97e9012e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 16:48:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix segfault with mangled rename patch
http://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?53132
* src/pch.c (intuit_diff_type): Ensure that two filenames are specified
for renames and copies (fix the existing check).
---
src/pch.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode
if ((pch_rename () || pch_copy ())
&& ! inname
&& ! ((i == OLD || i == NEW) &&
- p_name[! reverse] &&
+ p_name[reverse] && p_name[! reverse] &&
+ name_is_valid (p_name[reverse]) &&
name_is_valid (p_name[! reverse])))
{
say ("Cannot %s file without two valid file names\n", pch_rename () ? "rename" : "copy");

189
devel/patch/patches/020-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
View File

@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
From b56779aed483f0036a32a65e62ab7b5e461b07cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 12:14:49 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches
(CVE-2018-1000156)
* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Write ed script to a temporary file instead
of piping it to ed: this will cause ed to abort on invalid commands
instead of rejecting them and carrying on.
* tests/ed-style: New test case.
* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add test case. (OPENWRT REMOVED)
---
src/pch.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
tests/Makefile.am | 1 + (OPENWRT REMOVED)
tests/ed-style | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/ed-style
--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
# include <io.h>
#endif
#include <safe.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#define INITHUNKMAX 125 /* initial dynamic allocation size */
@@ -2389,22 +2390,28 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;
file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
- FILE *pipefp = 0;
size_t chars_read;
+ FILE *tmpfp = 0;
+ char const *tmpname;
+ int tmpfd;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch)
+ {
+ /* Write ed script to a temporary file. This causes ed to abort on
+ invalid commands such as when line numbers or ranges exceed the
+ number of available lines. When ed reads from a pipe, it rejects
+ invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
+ can lead to arbitrary command execution. */
+
+ tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
+ if (tmpfd == -1)
+ pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+ tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
+ if (! tmpfp)
+ pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+ }
- if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
- int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
- assert (! inerrno);
- *outname_needs_removal = true;
- copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
- outname);
- fflush (stdout);
- pipefp = popen(buf, binary_transput ? "wb" : "w");
- if (!pipefp)
- pfatal ("Can't open pipe to %s", quotearg (buf));
- }
for (;;) {
char ed_command_letter;
beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
@@ -2415,14 +2422,14 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
}
ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
if (ed_command_letter) {
- if (pipefp)
- if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
+ if (tmpfp)
+ if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
p_pass_comments_through = true;
while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
- if (pipefp)
- if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
+ if (tmpfp)
+ if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (chars_read == 2 && strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
break;
@@ -2435,13 +2442,49 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
break;
}
}
- if (!pipefp)
+ if (!tmpfp)
return;
- if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, pipefp) == 0
- || fflush (pipefp) != 0)
+ if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, tmpfp) == 0
+ || fflush (tmpfp) != 0)
write_fatal ();
- if (pclose (pipefp) != 0)
- fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
+
+ if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+ pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+
+ if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
+ int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
+ *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ if (inerrno != ENOENT)
+ {
+ *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ }
+ sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+ verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+ outname);
+ fflush (stdout);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1)
+ pfatal ("Can't fork");
+ else if (pid == 0)
+ {
+ dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+ execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
+ _exit (2);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int wstatus;
+ if (waitpid (pid, &wstatus, 0) == -1
+ || ! WIFEXITED (wstatus)
+ || WEXITSTATUS (wstatus) != 0)
+ fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fclose (tmpfp);
+ safe_unlink (tmpname);
if (ofp)
{
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/ed-style
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Copyright (C) 2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification,
+# in any medium, are permitted without royalty provided the copyright
+# notice and this notice are preserved.
+
+. $srcdir/test-lib.sh
+
+require cat
+use_local_patch
+use_tmpdir
+
+# ==============================================================
+
+cat > ed1.diff <<EOF
+0a
+foo
+.
+EOF
+
+check 'patch -e foo -i ed1.diff' <<EOF
+EOF
+
+check 'cat foo' <<EOF
+foo
+EOF
+
+cat > ed2.diff <<EOF
+1337a
+r !echo bar
+,p
+EOF
+
+check 'patch -e foo -i ed2.diff 2> /dev/null || echo "Status: $?"' <<EOF
+?
+Status: 2
+EOF
+
+check 'cat foo' <<EOF
+foo
+EOF

25
devel/patch/patches/030-CVE-2018-6952.patch
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@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
From 71607715f11c9875a5aaaf3240885c45f79138e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 13:35:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix swapping fake lines in pch_swap
* src/pch.c (pch_swap): Fix swapping p_bfake and p_efake when there is a
blank line in the middle of a context-diff hunk: that empty line stays
in the middle of the hunk and isn't swapped.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53133
---
src/pch.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ pch_swap (void)
}
if (p_efake >= 0) { /* fix non-freeable ptr range */
if (p_efake <= i)
- n = p_end - i + 1;
+ n = p_end - p_ptrn_lines;
else
n = -i;
p_efake += n;

101
devel/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch
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@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
that consistently for input files.
* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
---
src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/src/inp.c
+++ b/src/inp.c
@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
size_t buffered = 0, n;
+ int ifd;
+
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
static void
plan_b (char const *filename)
{
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
int ifd;
FILE *ifp;
int c;
@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
if (instat.st_size == 0)
filename = NULL_DEVICE;
- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
|| ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const str
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
safe_unlink (bakname);
- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_
static void
copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
{
+ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
int fromfd;
ssize_t i;
- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
{
@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
else
{
assert (S_ISREG (mode));
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
to_dir_known_to_exist);
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
void
append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
{
+ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
int tofd;
- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
if (close (tofd) != 0)

33
devel/patch/patches/060-CVE-2018-20969-CVE-2019-13638.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
---
src/pch.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
*outname_needs_removal = true;
copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
}
- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
- outname);
fflush (stdout);
pid = fork();
@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
else if (pid == 0)
{
dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
+ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
+ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL);
_exit (2);
}
else