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rtems-libbsd/mDNSResponder/mDNSCore/dnssec.c
Sebastian Huber 4c086a2446 mDNSResponder: Update to v878.1.1 
The sources can be obtained via:

https://opensource.apple.com/tarballs/mDNSResponder/mDNSResponder-878.1.1.tar.gz

Update #3522.
2018-09-20 11:23:33 +02:00

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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 4 -*-
*
* Copyright (c) 2011-2013 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "mDNSEmbeddedAPI.h"
#include "DNSSECSupport.h"
#include "DNSCommon.h"
#include "dnssec.h"
#include "CryptoAlg.h"
#include "nsec.h"
#include "nsec3.h"
// Define DNSSEC_DISABLED to remove all the DNSSEC functionality
// and use the stub functions implemented later in this file.
#ifndef DNSSEC_DISABLED
//#define DNSSEC_DEBUG
#ifdef DNSSEC_DEBUG
#define debugdnssec LogMsg
#else
#define debugdnssec debug_noop
#endif
//
// Implementation Notes
//
// The entry point to DNSSEC Verification is VerifySignature. This function is called from the "core" when
// the answer delivered to the application needs DNSSEC validation. If a question needs DNSSEC
// validation, "ValidationRequired" would be set. As we need to issue more queries to validate the
// original question, we create another question as part of the verification process (question is part of
// DNSSECVerifier). This question sets "ValidatingResponse" to distinguish itself from the original
// question. Without this, it will be a duplicate and never sent out. The "core" almost treats both the
// types identically (like adding EDNS0 option with DO bit etc.) except for a few differences. When RRSIGs
// are added to the cache, "ValidatingResponse" question gets called back as long as the typeCovered matches
// the question's qtype. See the comment in DNSSECRecordAnswersQuestion for the details. The other big
// difference is that "ValidationRequired" question kicks off the verification process by calling into
// "VerifySignature" whereas ValidationResponse don't do that as it gets callback for its questions.
//
// VerifySignature does not retain the original question that started the verification process. It just
// remembers the name and the type. It takes a snapshot of the cache at that instance which will be
// verified using DNSSEC. If the cache changes subsequently e.g., network change etc., it will be detected
// when the validation is completed. If there is a change, it will be revalidated.
//
// The verification flow looks like this:
//
// VerifySignature -> StartDNSSECVerification - GetAllRRSetsForVerification -> FinishDNSSECVerification -> VerifySignature
//
// Verification is a recursive process. It stops when we find a trust anchor or if we have recursed too deep.
//
// If the original question resulted in NODATA/NXDOMAIN error, there should have been NSECs as part of the response.
// These nsecs are cached along with the negative cache record. These are validated using ValidateWithNSECS called
// from Verifysignature.
//
// The flow in this case looks like this:
//
// VerifySignature -> ValidateWithNSECS -> {NoDataProof, NameErrorProof} -> VerifyNSECS -> StartDNSSECVerification
//
// Once the DNSSEC verification is started, it is similar to the previous flow described above. When the verification
// is done, DNSSECPositiveValidationCB or DNSSECNegativeValidationCB will be called which will then deliver the
// validation results to the original question that started the validation.
//
// Insecure proofs are done when the verification ends up bogus. The flow would look like this
//
// VerifySignature -> StartDNSSECVerification - GetAllRRSetsForVerification -> FinishDNSSECVerification -> DNSSECValidationCB
// {DNSSECPositiveValidationCB, DNSSECNegativeValidationCB} -> ProveInsecure -> VerifySignaure ->
//
// ProveInsecure finds the break in trust in a top-down fashion.
//
// Forward declaration
mDNSlocal void VerifySigCallback(mDNS *const m, DNSQuestion *question, const ResourceRecord *const answer, QC_result AddRecord);
mDNSlocal mStatus TrustedKey(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv);
mDNSlocal mDNSBool TrustedKeyPresent(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv);
mDNSlocal mStatus ValidateDS(DNSSECVerifier *dv);
mDNSlocal void DNSSECNegativeValidationCB(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheGroup *cg, ResourceRecord *answer, DNSSECStatus status);
mDNSlocal RRVerifier* CopyRRVerifier(RRVerifier *from);
mDNSlocal void FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(AuthChain *ac);
// Currently we use this to convert a RRVerifier to resource record so that we can
// use the standard DNS utility functions
LargeCacheRecord largerec;
// Verification is a recursive process. We arbitrarily limit to 10 just to be cautious which should be
// removed in the future.
#define MAX_RECURSE_COUNT 10
// TTL (in seconds) when the DNSSEC status is Bogus
#define RR_BOGUS_TTL 60
// RFC 4034 Appendix B: Get the keyid of a DNS KEY. It is not transmitted
// explicitly on the wire.
//
// Note: This just helps narrow down the list of keys to look at. It is possible
// for two DNS keys to have the same ID i.e., key ID is not a unqiue tag
//
// 1st argument - the RDATA part of the DNSKEY RR
// 2nd argument - the RDLENGTH
//
mDNSlocal mDNSu32 keytag(mDNSu8 *key, mDNSu32 keysize)
{
unsigned long ac;
unsigned int i;
// DST_ALG_RSAMD5 will be rejected automatically as the keytag
// is calculated wrongly
for (ac = 0, i = 0; i < keysize; ++i)
ac += (i & 1) ? key[i] : key[i] << 8;
ac += (ac >> 16) & 0xFFFF;
return ac & 0xFFFF;
}
mDNSexport int DNSMemCmp(const mDNSu8 *const m1, const mDNSu8 *const m2, int len)
{
int res;
res = mDNSPlatformMemCmp(m1, m2, len);
if (res != 0)
return (res < 0 ? -1 : 1);
return 0;
}
// RFC 4034:
//
// Section 6.1:
//
// For the purposes of DNS security, owner names are ordered by treating
// individual labels as unsigned left-justified octet strings. The
// absence of a octet sorts before a zero value octet, and uppercase
// US-ASCII letters are treated as if they were lowercase US-ASCII
// letters.
//
// To compute the canonical ordering of a set of DNS names, start by
// sorting the names according to their most significant (rightmost)
// labels. For names in which the most significant label is identical,
// continue sorting according to their next most significant label, and
// so forth.
//
// Returns 0 if the names are same
// Returns -1 if d1 < d2
// Returns 1 if d1 > d2
//
// subdomain is set if there is at least one label match (starting from the end)
// and d1 has more labels than d2 e.g., a.b.com is a subdomain of b.com
//
mDNSexport int DNSSECCanonicalOrder(const domainname *const d1, const domainname *const d2, int *subdomain)
{
int count, c1, c2;
int i, skip1, skip2;
c1 = CountLabels(d1);
skip1 = c1 - 1;
c2 = CountLabels(d2);
skip2 = c2 - 1;
if (subdomain) *subdomain = 0;
// Compare as many labels as possible starting from the rightmost
count = c1 < c2 ? c1 : c2;
for (i = count; i > 0; i--)
{
mDNSu8 *a, *b;
int j, len, lena, lenb;
a = (mDNSu8 *)SkipLeadingLabels(d1, skip1);
b = (mDNSu8 *)SkipLeadingLabels(d2, skip2);
lena = *a;
lenb = *b;
// Compare label by label. Note that "z" > "yak" because z > y, but z < za
// (lena - lenb check below) because 'za' has two characters. Hence compare the
// letters first and then compare the length of the label at the end.
len = lena < lenb ? lena : lenb;
a++; b++;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
{
mDNSu8 ac = *a++;
mDNSu8 bc = *b++;
if (mDNSIsUpperCase(ac)) ac += 'a' - 'A';
if (mDNSIsUpperCase(bc)) bc += 'a' - 'A';
if (ac != bc)
{
verbosedebugf("DNSSECCanonicalOrder: returning ac %c, bc %c", ac, bc);
return ((ac < bc) ? -1 : 1);
}
}
if ((lena - lenb) != 0)
{
verbosedebugf("DNSSECCanonicalOrder: returning lena %d lenb %d", lena, lenb);
return ((lena < lenb) ? -1 : 1);
}
// Continue with the next label
skip1--;
skip2--;
}
// We have compared label by label. Both of them are same if we are here.
//
// Two possibilities.
//
// 1) Both names have same number of labels. In that case, return zero.
// 2) The number of labels is not same. As zero label sorts before, names
// with more number of labels is greater.
// a.b.com is a subdomain of b.com
if ((c1 > c2) && subdomain)
*subdomain = 1;
verbosedebugf("DNSSECCanonicalOrder: returning c1 %d c2 %d\n", c1, c2);
if (c1 != c2)
return ((c1 < c2) ? -1 : 1);
else
return 0;
}
// Initialize the question enough so that it can be answered from the cache using SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion or
// ResourceRecordAnswersQuestion.
mDNSexport void InitializeQuestion(mDNS *const m, DNSQuestion *question, mDNSInterfaceID InterfaceID, const domainname *qname,
mDNSu16 qtype, mDNSQuestionCallback *callback, void *context)
{
debugf("InitializeQuestion: Called for %##s (%s)", qname->c, DNSTypeName(qtype));
if (question->ThisQInterval != -1) mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
mDNS_SetupQuestion(question, InterfaceID, qname, qtype, callback, context);
question->qnamehash = DomainNameHashValue(qname);
question->ValidatingResponse = mDNStrue;
// Need to hold the lock, as GetServerForQuestion (its callers) references m->timenow.
mDNS_Lock(m);
// We need to set the DNS server appropriately to match the question against the cache record.
// Though not all callers of this function need it, we always do it to keep it simple.
SetValidDNSServers(m, question);
question->qDNSServer = GetServerForQuestion(m, question);
mDNS_Unlock(m);
// Make it look like unicast
question->TargetQID = onesID;
question->TimeoutQuestion = 1;
question->ReturnIntermed = 1;
// SetupQuestion sets LongLived if qtype == PTR
question->LongLived = 0;
}
mDNSexport DNSSECVerifier *AllocateDNSSECVerifier(mDNS *const m, const domainname *name, mDNSu16 rrtype, mDNSInterfaceID InterfaceID,
mDNSu8 ValidationRequired, DNSSECVerifierCallback dvcallback, mDNSQuestionCallback qcallback)
{
DNSSECVerifier *dv;
dv = (DNSSECVerifier *)mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof(DNSSECVerifier));
if (!dv) { LogMsg("AllocateDNSSECVerifier: ERROR!! memory alloc failed"); return mDNSNULL; }
mDNSPlatformMemZero(dv, sizeof(*dv));
LogDNSSEC("AllocateDNSSECVerifier called %p", dv);
// Remember the question's name and type so that when we are done processing all
// the verifications, we can trace the original question back
AssignDomainName(&dv->origName, name);
dv->origType = rrtype;
dv->InterfaceID = InterfaceID;
dv->DVCallback = dvcallback;
dv->q.ThisQInterval = -1;
ResetAuthChain(dv);
// These two are used for Insecure proof if we end up doing it.
// -Value of ValidationRequired so that we know whether this is a secure or insecure validation
// -InsecureProofDone tells us whether the proof has been done or not
dv->ValidationRequired = ValidationRequired;
dv->InsecureProofDone = 0;
dv->NumPackets = 0;
mDNS_Lock(m);
dv->StartTime = m->timenow;
mDNS_Unlock(m);
// The verifier's question has to be initialized as some of the callers assume it
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, InterfaceID, name, rrtype, qcallback, dv);
return dv;
}
mDNSlocal AuthChain *AuthChainCopy(AuthChain *ae)
{
RRVerifier *rvfrom, **rvto;
AuthChain **prev = mDNSNULL;
AuthChain *retac = mDNSNULL;
AuthChain *ac;
while (ae)
{
ac = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof(AuthChain));
if (!ac)
{
LogMsg("AuthChainCopy: AuthChain alloc failure");
if (retac)
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(retac);
return mDNSfalse;
}
ac->next = mDNSNULL;
if (!retac)
retac = ac;
rvfrom = ae->rrset;
rvto = &ac->rrset;
while (rvfrom && rvto)
{
*rvto = CopyRRVerifier(rvfrom);
rvfrom = rvfrom->next;
rvto = &((*rvto)->next);
}
rvfrom = ae->rrsig;
rvto = &ac->rrsig;
while (rvfrom && rvto)
{
*rvto = CopyRRVerifier(rvfrom);
rvfrom = rvfrom->next;
rvto = &((*rvto)->next);
}
rvfrom = ae->key;
rvto = &ac->key;
while (rvfrom && rvto)
{
*rvto = CopyRRVerifier(rvfrom);
rvfrom = rvfrom->next;
rvto = &((*rvto)->next);
}
if (prev)
{
*prev = ac;
}
prev = &(ac->next);
ae = ae->next;
}
return retac;
}
mDNSlocal void FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(AuthChain *ac)
{
RRVerifier *rrset;
RRVerifier *next;
AuthChain *acnext;
LogDNSSEC("FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo: called");
while (ac)
{
acnext = ac->next;
rrset = ac->rrset;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
ac->rrset = mDNSNULL;
rrset = ac->rrsig;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
ac->rrsig = mDNSNULL;
rrset = ac->key;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
ac->key = mDNSNULL;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(ac);
ac = acnext;
}
}
mDNSlocal void FreeDNSSECAuthChain(DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
if (dv->ac)
{
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(dv->ac);
// if someone reuses the "dv", it will be initialized properly
ResetAuthChain(dv);
}
if (dv->saveac)
{
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(dv->saveac);
dv->saveac = mDNSNULL;
}
}
mDNSlocal void FreeAuthChain(mDNS *const m, void *context)
{
AuthChain *ac = (AuthChain *)context;
(void) m; // unused
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(ac);
}
mDNSlocal void FreeDNSSECVerifierRRSets(DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
RRVerifier *rrset;
RRVerifier *next;
//debugdnssec("FreeDNSSECVerifierRRSets called %p", dv);
rrset = dv->rrset;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->rrset = mDNSNULL;
rrset = dv->rrsig;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->rrsig = mDNSNULL;
rrset = dv->key;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->key = mDNSNULL;
rrset = dv->rrsigKey;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->rrsigKey = mDNSNULL;
rrset = dv->ds;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->ds = mDNSNULL;
rrset = dv->pendingNSEC;
while (rrset)
{
next = rrset->next;
mDNSPlatformMemFree(rrset);
rrset = next;
}
dv->pendingNSEC = mDNSNULL;
}
mDNSexport void FreeDNSSECVerifier(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
LogDNSSEC("FreeDNSSECVerifier called %p", dv);
if (dv->q.ThisQInterval != -1)
mDNS_StopQuery(m, &dv->q);
FreeDNSSECVerifierRRSets(dv);
if (dv->ctx)
AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
if (dv->ac || dv->saveac)
FreeDNSSECAuthChain(dv);
if (dv->parent)
{
LogDNSSEC("FreeDNSSECVerifier freeing parent %p", dv->parent);
FreeDNSSECVerifier(m, dv->parent);
}
mDNSPlatformMemFree(dv);
}
mDNSlocal RRVerifier* CopyRRVerifier(RRVerifier *from)
{
RRVerifier *r;
r = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof (RRVerifier) + from->rdlength);
if (!r)
{
LogMsg("CopyRRVerifier: memory failure");
return mDNSNULL;
}
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(r, from, sizeof(RRVerifier));
r->next = mDNSNULL;
r->rdata = (mDNSu8*) ((mDNSu8 *)r + sizeof(RRVerifier));
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(r->rdata, from->rdata, r->rdlength);
return r;
}
mDNSexport RRVerifier* AllocateRRVerifier(const ResourceRecord *const rr, mStatus *status)
{
RRVerifier *r;
r = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof (RRVerifier) + rr->rdlength);
if (!r)
{
LogMsg("AllocateRRVerifier: memory failure");
*status = mStatus_NoMemoryErr;
return mDNSNULL;
}
r->next = mDNSNULL;
r->rrtype = rr->rrtype;
r->rrclass = rr->rrclass;
r->rroriginalttl = rr->rroriginalttl;
r->rdlength = rr->rdlength;
r->namehash = rr->namehash;
r->rdatahash = rr->rdatahash;
AssignDomainName(&r->name, rr->name);
r->rdata = (mDNSu8*) ((mDNSu8 *)r + sizeof(RRVerifier));
// When we parsed the DNS response in GeLargeResourceRecord, for some records, we parse them into
// host order so that the rest of the code does not have to bother with converting from network order
// to host order. For signature verification, we need them back in network order. For DNSSEC records
// like DNSKEY and DS, we just copy over the data both in GetLargeResourceRecord and putRData.
if (!putRData(mDNSNULL, r->rdata, r->rdata + rr->rdlength, rr))
{
LogMsg("AllocateRRVerifier: putRData failed");
*status = mStatus_BadParamErr;
return mDNSNULL;
}
*status = mStatus_NoError;
return r;
}
mDNSexport mStatus AddRRSetToVerifier(DNSSECVerifier *dv, const ResourceRecord *const rr, RRVerifier *rv, RRVerifierSet set)
{
RRVerifier *r;
RRVerifier **v;
mStatus status;
if (!rv)
{
r = AllocateRRVerifier(rr, &status);
if (!r) return status;
}
else
r = rv;
switch (set)
{
case RRVS_rr:
v = &dv->rrset;
break;
case RRVS_rrsig:
v = &dv->rrsig;
break;
case RRVS_key:
v = &dv->key;
break;
case RRVS_rrsig_key:
v = &dv->rrsigKey;
break;
case RRVS_ds:
v = &dv->ds;
break;
default:
LogMsg("AddRRSetToVerifier: ERROR!! default case %d", set);
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
while (*v)
v = &(*v)->next;
*v = r;
return mStatus_NoError;
}
// Validate the RRSIG. "type" tells which RRSIG that we are supposed to validate. We fetch RRSIG for
// the rrset (type is RRVS_rrsig) and RRSIG for the key (type is RRVS_rrsig_key).
mDNSexport void ValidateRRSIG(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifierSet type, const ResourceRecord *const rr)
{
RRVerifier *rv;
mDNSu32 currentTime;
rdataRRSig *rrsigRData = (rdataRRSig *)((mDNSu8 *)rr->rdata + sizeofRDataHeader);
if (type == RRVS_rrsig)
{
rv = dv->rrset;
}
else if (type == RRVS_rrsig_key)
{
rv = dv->key;
}
else
{
LogMsg("ValidateRRSIG: ERROR!! type not valid %d", type);
return;
}
// RFC 4035:
// For each authoritative RRset in a signed zone, there MUST be at least
// one RRSIG record that meets the following requirements:
//
// RRSet is defined by same name, class and type
//
// 1. The RRSIG RR and the RRset MUST have the same owner name and the same class.
if (!SameDomainName(&rv->name, rr->name) || (rr->rrclass != rv->rrclass))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: name mismatch or class mismatch");
return;
}
// 2. The RRSIG RR's Type Covered field MUST equal the RRset's type.
if ((swap16(rrsigRData->typeCovered)) != rv->rrtype)
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: typeCovered mismatch rrsig %d, rr type %d", swap16(rrsigRData->typeCovered), rv->rrtype);
return;
}
// 3. The number of labels in the RRset owner name MUST be greater than or equal
// to the value in the RRSIG RR's Labels field.
if (rrsigRData->labels > CountLabels(&rv->name))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: labels count problem rrsig %d, rr %d", rrsigRData->labels, CountLabels(&rv->name));
return;
}
// 4. The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone that contains
// the RRset. For a stub resolver, this can't be done in a secure way. Hence we
// do it this way (discussed in dnsext mailing list)
switch (rv->rrtype)
{
case kDNSType_NS:
case kDNSType_SOA:
case kDNSType_DNSKEY:
//Signed by the owner
if (!SameDomainName(&rv->name, (domainname *)&rrsigRData->signerName))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: Signer Name does not match the record name for %s", DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
return;
}
break;
case kDNSType_DS:
// Should be signed by the parent
if (SameDomainName(&rv->name, (domainname *)&rrsigRData->signerName))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: Signer Name matches the record name for %s", DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
return;
}
// FALLTHROUGH
default:
{
int c1 = CountLabels(&rv->name);
int c2 = CountLabels((domainname *)&rrsigRData->signerName);
if (c1 < c2)
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: Signer Name not a subdomain label count %d < %d ", c1, c2);
return;
}
domainname *d = (domainname *)SkipLeadingLabels(&rv->name, c1 - c2);
if (!SameDomainName(d, (domainname *)&rrsigRData->signerName))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateRRSIG: Signer Name not a subdomain");
return;
}
break;
}
}
// 5. The validator's notion of the current time MUST be less than or equal to the
// time listed in the RRSIG RR's Expiration field.
//
// 6. The validator's notion of the current time MUST be greater than or equal to the
// time listed in the RRSIG RR's Inception field.
currentTime = mDNSPlatformUTC();
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(swap32(rrsigRData->sigExpireTime), currentTime))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateRRSIG: Expired: currentTime %d, ExpireTime %d", (int)currentTime,
swap32((int)rrsigRData->sigExpireTime));
return;
}
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(currentTime, swap32(rrsigRData->sigInceptTime)))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateRRSIG: Future: currentTime %d, InceptTime %d", (int)currentTime,
swap32((int)rrsigRData->sigInceptTime));
return;
}
if (AddRRSetToVerifier(dv, rr, mDNSNULL, type) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ValidateRRSIG: ERROR!! cannot allocate RRSet");
return;
}
}
mDNSlocal mStatus CheckRRSIGForRRSet(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheRecord **negcr)
{
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
RRVerifier *rv;
mDNSBool expectRRSIG = mDNSfalse;
*negcr = mDNSNULL;
if (!dv->rrset)
{
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: ERROR!! rrset NULL for origName %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
rv = dv->rrset;
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, rv->namehash, &rv->name);
if (!cg)
{
debugdnssec("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: cg null");
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
for (cr=cg->members; cr; cr=cr->next)
{
debugdnssec("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: checking the validity of rrsig");
if (cr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
// Check to see if we should expect RRSIGs for the type that we are looking for.
// We would expect RRSIGs, if we had previously issued the question with the
// EDNS0/DOK bit set.
if (cr->resrec.rrtype == dv->rrset->rrtype)
{
expectRRSIG = cr->CRDNSSECQuestion;
LogDNSSEC("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: %s RRSIG for %s", (expectRRSIG ? "Expecting" : "Not Expecting"), CRDisplayString(m, cr));
}
continue;
}
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
{
if (!(*negcr))
{
LogDNSSEC("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: Negative cache record %s encountered for %##s (%s)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
*negcr = cr;
}
else
{
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: ERROR!! Negative cache record %s already set for %##s (%s)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
}
continue;
}
ValidateRRSIG(dv, RRVS_rrsig, &cr->resrec);
}
if (*negcr && dv->rrsig)
{
// Encountered both RRSIG and negative CR
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForRRSet: ERROR!! Encountered negative cache record %s and RRSIG for %##s (%s)",
CRDisplayString(m, *negcr), rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
// If we can't find RRSIGs, but we find a negative response then we need to validate that
// which the caller will do it. Otherwise, if we should be expecting RRSIGs to be in the
// cache already, then return error.
if (dv->rrsig || *negcr)
return mStatus_NoError;
else if (expectRRSIG)
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
else
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal void CheckOneKeyForRRSIG(DNSSECVerifier *dv, const ResourceRecord *const rr)
{
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckOneKeyForRRSIG: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return;
}
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
if (!SameDomainName((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, rr->name))
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneKeyForRRSIG: name mismatch");
return;
}
// We store all the keys including the ZSK and KSK and use them appropriately
// later
if (AddRRSetToVerifier(dv, rr, mDNSNULL, RRVS_key) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("CheckOneKeyForRRSIG: ERROR!! cannot allocate RRSet");
return;
}
}
mDNSlocal mStatus CheckKeyForRRSIG(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheRecord **negcr)
{
mDNSu32 namehash;
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
domainname *name;
*negcr = mDNSNULL;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckKeyForRRSIG: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
// Signer name should be the same on all rrsig ??
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
name = (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName;
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(name);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, name);
if (!cg)
{
debugdnssec("CheckKeyForRRSIG: cg null for %##s", name->c);
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
for (cr=cg->members; cr; cr=cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_DNSKEY) continue;
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
{
if (!(*negcr))
{
LogDNSSEC("CheckKeyForRRSIG: Negative cache record %s encountered for %##s (DNSKEY)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
*negcr = cr;
}
else
{
LogMsg("CheckKeyForRRSIG: ERROR!! Negative cache record %s already set for %##s (DNSKEY)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
}
continue;
}
debugdnssec("CheckKeyForRRSIG: checking the validity of key record");
CheckOneKeyForRRSIG(dv, &cr->resrec);
}
if (*negcr && dv->key)
{
// Encountered both RRSIG and negative CR
LogMsg("CheckKeyForRRSIG: ERROR!! Encountered negative cache record %s and DNSKEY for %##s",
CRDisplayString(m, *negcr), name->c);
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
if (dv->key || *negcr)
return mStatus_NoError;
else
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal void CheckOneRRSIGForKey(DNSSECVerifier *dv, const ResourceRecord *const rr)
{
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckOneRRSIGForKey: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return;
}
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
if (!SameDomainName((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, rr->name))
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneRRSIGForKey: name mismatch");
return;
}
ValidateRRSIG(dv, RRVS_rrsig_key, rr);
}
mDNSlocal mStatus CheckRRSIGForKey(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheRecord **negcr)
{
mDNSu32 namehash;
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
domainname *name;
mDNSBool expectRRSIG = mDNSfalse;
*negcr = mDNSNULL;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForKey: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
if (!dv->key)
{
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForKey: ERROR!! key NULL");
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
name = (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName;
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(name);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, name);
if (!cg)
{
debugdnssec("CheckRRSIGForKey: cg null %##s", name->c);
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
for (cr=cg->members; cr; cr=cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
// Check to see if we should expect RRSIGs for the DNSKEY record that we are
// looking for. We would expect RRSIGs, if we had previously issued the question
// with the EDNS0/DOK bit set.
if (cr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_DNSKEY)
{
expectRRSIG = cr->CRDNSSECQuestion;
LogDNSSEC("CheckRRSIGForKey: %s RRSIG for %s", (expectRRSIG ? "Expecting" : "Not Expecting"), CRDisplayString(m, cr));
}
continue;
}
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
{
if (!(*negcr))
{
LogDNSSEC("CheckRRSIGForKey: Negative cache record %s encountered for %##s (RRSIG)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
*negcr = cr;
}
else
{
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForKey: ERROR!! Negative cache record %s already set for %##s (RRSIG)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
}
continue;
}
debugdnssec("CheckRRSIGForKey: checking the validity of rrsig");
CheckOneRRSIGForKey(dv, &cr->resrec);
}
if (*negcr && dv->rrsigKey)
{
// Encountered both RRSIG and negative CR
LogMsg("CheckRRSIGForKey: ERROR!! Encountered negative cache record %s and DNSKEY for %##s",
CRDisplayString(m, *negcr), name->c);
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
// If we can't find RRSIGs, but we find a negative response then we need to validate that
// which the caller will do it. Finally, make sure that we are not expecting RRSIGS.
if (dv->rrsigKey || *negcr)
return mStatus_NoError;
else if (expectRRSIG)
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
else
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal void CheckOneDSForKey(DNSSECVerifier *dv, const ResourceRecord *const rr)
{
mDNSu16 tag;
rdataDS *DS;
RRVerifier *keyv;
rdataDNSKey *key;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckOneDSForKey: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return;
}
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
DS = (rdataDS *)((mDNSu8 *)rr->rdata + sizeofRDataHeader);
if (!SameDomainName((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, rr->name))
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneDSForKey: name mismatch");
return;
}
for (keyv = dv->key; keyv; keyv = keyv->next)
{
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
if (tag != swap16(DS->keyTag))
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneDSForKey: keyTag mismatch keyTag %d, DStag %d", tag, swap16(DS->keyTag));
continue;
}
if (key->alg != DS->alg)
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneDSForKey: alg mismatch key alg%d, DS alg %d", key->alg, swap16(DS->alg));
continue;
}
if (AddRRSetToVerifier(dv, rr, mDNSNULL, RRVS_ds) != mStatus_NoError)
{
debugdnssec("CheckOneDSForKey: cannot allocate RRSet");
}
}
}
mDNSlocal mStatus CheckDSForKey(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheRecord **negcr)
{
mDNSu32 namehash;
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
domainname *name;
*negcr = mDNSNULL;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
LogMsg("CheckDSForKey: ERROR!! rrsig NULL");
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
if (!dv->key)
{
LogMsg("CheckDSForKey: ERROR!! key NULL");
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
name = (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName;
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(name);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, name);
if (!cg)
{
debugdnssec("CheckDSForKey: cg null for %s", name->c);
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
for (cr=cg->members; cr; cr=cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_DS) continue;
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
{
if (!(*negcr))
{
LogDNSSEC("CheckDSForKey: Negative cache record %s encountered for %##s (DS)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
*negcr = cr;
}
else
{
LogMsg("CheckDSForKey: ERROR!! Negative cache record %s already set for %##s (DS)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
name->c);
}
continue;
}
CheckOneDSForKey(dv, &cr->resrec);
}
if (*negcr && dv->ds)
{
// Encountered both RRSIG and negative CR
LogMsg("CheckDSForKey: ERROR!! Encountered negative cache record %s and DS for %##s",
CRDisplayString(m, *negcr), name->c);
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
if (dv->ds || *negcr)
return mStatus_NoError;
else
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
// It returns mDNStrue if we have all the rrsets for verification and mDNSfalse otherwise.
mDNSlocal mDNSBool GetAllRRSetsForVerification(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
mStatus err;
CacheRecord *negcr;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
if (!dv->rrset)
{
LogMsg("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: ERROR!! rrset NULL");
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
if (dv->next == RRVS_done) return mDNStrue;
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: next %d", dv->next);
switch (dv->next)
{
case RRVS_rrsig:
// If we can't find the RRSIG for the rrset, re-issue the query.
//
// NOTE: It is possible that the cache might answer partially e.g., RRSIGs match qtype but the
// whole set is not there. In that case the validation will fail. Ideally we should flush the
// cache and reissue the query (TBD).
err = CheckRRSIGForRRSet(m, dv, &negcr);
if (err != mStatus_NoSuchRecord && err != mStatus_NoError)
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// Need to initialize the question as if we end up in ValidateWithNSECS below, the nsec proofs
// looks in "dv->q" for the proof. Note that we have to use currQtype as the response could be
// a CNAME and dv->rrset->rrtype would be set to CNAME and not the original question type that
// resulted in CNAME.
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, &dv->rrset->name, dv->currQtype, VerifySigCallback, dv);
// We may not have the NSECS if the previous query was a non-DNSSEC query
if (negcr && negcr->nsec)
{
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, negcr);
return mDNSfalse;
}
dv->next = RRVS_key;
if (!dv->rrsig)
{
// We already found the rrset to verify. Ideally we should just issue the query for the RRSIG. Unfortunately,
// that does not work well as the response may not contain the RRSIG whose typeCovered matches the
// rrset->rrtype (recursive server returns what is in its cache). Hence, we send the original query with the
// DO bit set again to get the RRSIG. Normally this would happen if there was question which did not require
// DNSSEC validation (ValidationRequied = 0) populated the cache and later when the ValidationRequired question
// comes along, we need to get the RRSIGs. If we started off with ValidationRequired question we would have
// already set the DO bit and not able to get RRSIGs e.g., bad CPE device, we would reissue the query here
// again once more.
//
// Also, if it is a wildcard expanded answer, we need to issue the query with the original type for it to
// elicit the right NSEC records. Just querying for RRSIG alone is not sufficient.
//
// Note: For this to work, the core needs to deliver RRSIGs when they are added to the cache even if the
// "qtype" is not RRSIG.
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Fetching RRSIGS for RRSET");
dv->NumPackets++;
mDNS_StartQuery(m, &dv->q);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// if we found the RRSIG, then fall through to find the DNSKEY
case RRVS_key:
err = CheckKeyForRRSIG(m, dv, &negcr);
if (err != mStatus_NoSuchRecord && err != mStatus_NoError)
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// Need to initialize the question as if we end up in ValidateWithNSECS below, the nsec proofs
// looks in "dv->q" for the proof.
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, kDNSType_DNSKEY, VerifySigCallback, dv);
// We may not have the NSECS if the previous query was a non-DNSSEC query
if (negcr && negcr->nsec)
{
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, negcr);
return mDNSfalse;
}
dv->next = RRVS_rrsig_key;
if (!dv->key)
{
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Fetching DNSKEY for RRSET");
dv->NumPackets++;
mDNS_StartQuery(m, &dv->q);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// if we found the DNSKEY, then fall through to find the RRSIG for the DNSKEY
case RRVS_rrsig_key:
err = CheckRRSIGForKey(m, dv, &negcr);
// if we are falling through, then it is okay if we don't find the record
if (err != mStatus_NoSuchRecord && err != mStatus_NoError)
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// Need to initialize the question as if we end up in ValidateWithNSECS below, the nsec proofs
// looks in "dv->q" for the proof.
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, kDNSType_DNSKEY, VerifySigCallback, dv);
// We may not have the NSECS if the previous query was a non-DNSSEC query
if (negcr && negcr->nsec)
{
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, negcr);
return mDNSfalse;
}
dv->next = RRVS_ds;
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: RRVS_rrsig_key %p", dv->rrsigKey);
if (!dv->rrsigKey)
{
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Fetching RRSIGS for DNSKEY");
dv->NumPackets++;
mDNS_StartQuery(m, &dv->q);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// if we found RRSIG for the DNSKEY, then fall through to find the DS
case RRVS_ds:
{
domainname *qname;
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
qname = (domainname *)&rrsig->signerName;
err = CheckDSForKey(m, dv, &negcr);
if (err != mStatus_NoSuchRecord && err != mStatus_NoError)
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
// Need to initialize the question as if we end up in ValidateWithNSECS below, the nsec proofs
// looks in "dv->q" for the proof.
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, qname, kDNSType_DS, VerifySigCallback, dv);
// We may not have the NSECS if the previous query was a non-DNSSEC query
if (negcr && negcr->nsec)
{
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, negcr);
return mDNSfalse;
}
dv->next = RRVS_done;
// If we have a trust anchor, then don't bother looking up the DS record
if (!dv->ds && !TrustedKeyPresent(m, dv))
{
// There is no DS for the root. Hence, if we don't have the trust
// anchor for root, just fail.
if (SameDomainName(qname, (const domainname *)"\000"))
{
LogDNSSEC("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Reached root");
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Fetching DS");
dv->NumPackets++;
mDNS_StartQuery(m, &dv->q);
return mDNSfalse;
}
else
{
debugdnssec("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: Skipped fetching the DS");
return mDNStrue;
}
}
default:
LogMsg("GetAllRRSetsForVerification: ERROR!! unknown next %d", dv->next);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return mDNSfalse;
}
}
#ifdef DNSSEC_DEBUG
mDNSlocal void PrintFixedSignInfo(rdataRRSig *rrsig, domainname *signerName, int sigNameLen, mDNSu8 *fixedPart, int fixedPartLen)
{
int j;
char buf[RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE *3 + 1]; // 3 bytes count for %2x + 1 and the one byte for null at the end
char sig[sigNameLen * 3 + 1];
char fp[fixedPartLen * 3 + 1];
int length;
length = 0;
for (j = 0; j < RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE; j++)
length += mDNS_snprintf(buf+length, sizeof(buf) - length - 1, "%2x ", ((mDNSu8 *)rrsig)[j]);
LogMsg("RRSIG(%d) %s", RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE, buf);
length = 0;
for (j = 0; j < sigNameLen; j++)
length += mDNS_snprintf(sig+length, sizeof(sig) - length - 1, "%2x ", signerName->c[j]);
LogMsg("SIGNAME(%d) %s", sigNameLen, sig);
length = 0;
for (j = 0; j < fixedPartLen; j++)
length += mDNS_snprintf(fp+length, sizeof(fp) - length - 1, "%2x ", fixedPart[j]);
LogMsg("fixedPart(%d) %s", fixedPartLen, fp);
}
mDNSlocal void PrintVarSignInfo(mDNSu16 rdlen, mDNSu8 *rdata)
{
unsigned int j;
mDNSu8 *r;
unsigned int blen = swap16(rdlen);
char buf[blen * 3 + 1]; // 3 bytes count for %2x + 1 and the one byte for null at the end
int length;
length = 0;
r = (mDNSu8 *)&rdlen;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(mDNSu16); j++)
length += mDNS_snprintf(buf+length, sizeof(buf) - length - 1, "%2x ", r[j]);
LogMsg("RDLENGTH(%d) %s", sizeof(mDNSu16), buf);
length = 0;
for (j = 0; j < blen; j++)
length += mDNS_snprintf(buf+length, sizeof(buf) - length - 1, "%2x ", rdata[j]);
LogMsg("RDATA(%d) %s", blen, buf);
}
#else
mDNSlocal void PrintVarSignInfo(mDNSu16 rdlen, mDNSu8 *rdata)
{
(void)rdlen;
(void)rdata;
}
mDNSlocal void PrintFixedSignInfo(rdataRRSig *rrsig, domainname *signerName, int sigNameLen, mDNSu8 *fixedPart, int fixedPartLen)
{
(void)rrsig;
(void)signerName;
(void)sigNameLen;
(void)fixedPart;
(void)fixedPartLen;
}
#endif
// Used for RDATA comparison
typedef struct
{
mDNSu16 rdlength;
mDNSu16 rrtype;
mDNSu8 *rdata;
} rdataComp;
mDNSlocal int rdata_compare(mDNSu8 *const rdata1, mDNSu8 *const rdata2, int rdlen1, int rdlen2)
{
int len;
int ret;
len = (rdlen1 < rdlen2) ? rdlen1 : rdlen2;
ret = DNSMemCmp(rdata1, rdata2, len);
if (ret != 0) return ret;
// RDATA is same at this stage. Consider them equal if they are of same length. Otherwise
// decide based on their lengths.
return ((rdlen1 == rdlen2) ? 0 : (rdlen1 < rdlen2) ? -1 : 1);
}
mDNSlocal int name_compare(mDNSu8 *const rdata1, mDNSu8 *const rdata2, int rdlen1, int rdlen2)
{
domainname *n1 = (domainname *)rdata1;
domainname *n2 = (domainname *)rdata2;
mDNSu8 *a = n1->c;
mDNSu8 *b = n2->c;
int count, c1, c2;
int i, j, len;
c1 = CountLabels(n1);
c2 = CountLabels(n2);
count = c1 < c2 ? c1 : c2;
// We can't use SameDomainName as we need to know exactly which is greater/smaller
// for sorting purposes. Hence, we need to compare label by label
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
// Are the lengths same ?
if (*a != *b)
{
debugdnssec("compare_name: returning c1 %d, c2 %d", *a, *b);
return ((*a < *b) ? -1 : 1);
}
len = *a;
rdlen1 -= (len + 1);
rdlen2 -= (len + 1);
if (rdlen1 < 0 || rdlen2 < 0)
{
LogMsg("name_compare: ERROR!! not enough data rdlen1 %d, rdlen2 %d", rdlen1, rdlen2);
return -1;
}
a++; b++;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
{
mDNSu8 ac = *a++;
mDNSu8 bc = *b++;
if (mDNSIsUpperCase(ac)) ac += 'a' - 'A';
if (mDNSIsUpperCase(bc)) bc += 'a' - 'A';
if (ac != bc)
{
debugdnssec("compare_name: returning ac %c, bc %c", ac, bc);
return ((ac < bc) ? -1 : 1);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
mDNSlocal int srv_compare(rdataComp *const r1, rdataComp *const r2)
{
int res;
int length1, length2;
length1 = r1->rdlength;
length2 = r2->rdlength;
// We should have at least priority, weight, port plus 1 byte
if (length1 < 7 || length2 < 7)
{
LogMsg("srv_compare: ERROR!! Length smaller than 7 bytes");
return -1;
}
// Compare priority, weight and port
res = DNSMemCmp(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, 6);
if (res != 0) return res;
length1 -= 6;
length2 -= 6;
return (name_compare(r1->rdata + 6, r2->rdata + 6, length1, length2));
}
mDNSlocal int tsig_compare(rdataComp *const r1, rdataComp *const r2)
{
int offset1, offset2;
int length1, length2;
int res, dlen;
offset1 = offset2 = 0;
length1 = r1->rdlength;
length2 = r2->rdlength;
// we should have at least one byte to start with
if (length1 < 1 || length2 < 1)
{
LogMsg("sig_compare: Length smaller than 18 bytes");
return -1;
}
res = name_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
dlen = DomainNameLength((domainname *)r1->rdata);
offset1 += dlen;
offset2 += dlen;
length1 -= dlen;
length2 -= dlen;
if (length1 <= 1 || length2 <= 1)
{
LogMsg("tsig_compare: data too small to compare length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
return (rdata_compare(r1->rdata + offset1, r2->rdata + offset2, length1, length2));
}
// Compares types that conform to : <length><Value>
mDNSlocal int lenval_compare(mDNSu8 *d1, mDNSu8 *d2, int *len1, int *len2, int rem1, int rem2)
{
int len;
int res;
if (rem1 <= 1 || rem2 <= 1)
{
LogMsg("lenval_compare: data too small to compare length1 %d, length2 %d", rem1, rem2);
return -1;
}
*len1 = (int)d1[0];
*len2 = (int)d2[0];
len = (*len1 < *len2 ? *len1 : *len2);
res = DNSMemCmp(d1, d2, len + 1);
return res;
}
// RFC 2915: Order (2) Preference(2) and variable length: Flags Service Regexp Replacement
mDNSlocal int naptr_compare(rdataComp *const r1, rdataComp *const r2)
{
mDNSu8 *d1 = r1->rdata;
mDNSu8 *d2 = r2->rdata;
int len1, len2, res;
int length1, length2;
length1 = r1->rdlength;
length2 = r2->rdlength;
// Order, Preference plus at least 1 byte
if (length1 < 5 || length2 < 5)
{
LogMsg("naptr_compare: Length smaller than 18 bytes");
return -1;
}
// Compare order and preference
res = DNSMemCmp(d1, d2, 4);
if (res != 0) return res;
d1 += 4;
d2 += 4;
length1 -= 4;
length2 -= 4;
// Compare Flags (including the length byte)
res = lenval_compare(d1, d2, &len1, &len2, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
d1 += (len1 + 1);
d2 += (len2 + 1);
length1 -= (len1 + 1);
length2 -= (len2 + 1);
// Compare Service (including the length byte)
res = lenval_compare(d1, d2, &len1, &len2, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
d1 += (len1 + 1);
d2 += (len2 + 1);
length1 -= (len1 + 1);
length2 -= (len2 + 1);
// Compare regexp (including the length byte)
res = lenval_compare(d1, d2, &len1, &len2, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
d1 += (len1 + 1);
d2 += (len2 + 1);
length1 -= (len1 + 1);
length2 -= (len2 + 1);
// Compare Replacement
return name_compare(d1, d2, length1, length2);
}
// RFC 1035: MINFO: Two domain names
// RFC 1183: RP: Two domain names
mDNSlocal int dom2_compare(mDNSu8 *d1, mDNSu8 *d2, int length1, int length2)
{
int res, dlen;
// We need at least one byte to start with
if (length1 < 1 || length2 < 1)
{
LogMsg("dom2_compare:1: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
res = name_compare(d1, d2, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
dlen = DomainNameLength((domainname *)d1);
length1 -= dlen;
length2 -= dlen;
// We need at least one byte to start with
if (length1 < 1 || length2 < 1)
{
LogMsg("dom2_compare:2: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
d1 += dlen;
d2 += dlen;
return name_compare(d1, d2, length1, length2);
}
// MX : preference (2 bytes), domainname
mDNSlocal int mx_compare(rdataComp *const r1, rdataComp *const r2)
{
int res;
int length1, length2;
length1 = r1->rdlength;
length2 = r2->rdlength;
// We need at least two bytes + 1 extra byte for the domainname to start with
if (length1 < 3 || length2 < 3)
{
LogMsg("mx_compare: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
res = DNSMemCmp(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, 2);
if (res != 0) return res;
length1 -= 2;
length2 -= 2;
return name_compare(r1->rdata + 2, r2->rdata + 2, length1, length2);
}
// RFC 2163 (PX) : preference (2 bytes), map822. mapx400 (domainnames)
mDNSlocal int px_compare(rdataComp *const r1, rdataComp *const r2)
{
int res;
// We need at least two bytes + 1 extra byte for the domainname to start with
if (r1->rdlength < 3 || r2->rdlength < 3)
{
LogMsg("px_compare: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", r1->rdlength, r2->rdlength);
return -1;
}
res = DNSMemCmp(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, 2);
if (res != 0) return res;
return dom2_compare(r1->rdata + 2, r2->rdata + 2, r1->rdlength - 2, r2->rdlength - 2);
}
mDNSlocal int soa_compare(rdataComp *r1, rdataComp *r2)
{
int res, dlen;
int offset1, offset2;
int length1, length2;
length1 = r1->rdlength;
length2 = r2->rdlength;
offset1 = offset2 = 0;
// We need at least 20 bytes plus 1 byte for each domainname
if (length1 < 22 || length2 < 22)
{
LogMsg("soa_compare:1: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
// There are two domainnames followed by 20 bytes of serial, refresh, retry, expire and min
// Compare the names and then the rest of the bytes
res = name_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
dlen = DomainNameLength((domainname *)r1->rdata);
length1 -= dlen;
length2 -= dlen;
if (length1 < 1 || length2 < 1)
{
LogMsg("soa_compare:2: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
offset1 += dlen;
offset2 += dlen;
res = name_compare(r1->rdata + offset1, r2->rdata + offset2, length1, length2);
if (res != 0) return res;
dlen = DomainNameLength((domainname *)r1->rdata);
length1 -= dlen;
length2 -= dlen;
if (length1 < 20 || length2 < 20)
{
LogMsg("soa_compare:3: data too small length1 %d, length2 %d", length1, length2);
return -1;
}
offset1 += dlen;
offset2 += dlen;
return (rdata_compare(r1->rdata + offset1, r2->rdata + offset2, length1, length2));
}
// RFC 4034 Section 6.0 states that:
//
// A canonical RR form and ordering within an RRset are required in order to
// construct and verify RRSIG RRs.
//
// This function is called to order within an RRset. We can't just do a memcmp as
// as stated in 6.3. This function is responsible for the third bullet in 6.2, where
// the RDATA has to be converted to lower case if it has domain names.
mDNSlocal int RDATACompare(const void *rdata1, const void *rdata2)
{
rdataComp *r1 = (rdataComp *)rdata1;
rdataComp *r2 = (rdataComp *)rdata2;
if (r1->rrtype != r2->rrtype)
{
LogMsg("RDATACompare: ERROR!! comparing rdata of wrong types type1: %d, type2: %d", r1->rrtype, r2->rrtype);
return -1;
}
switch (r1->rrtype)
{
case kDNSType_A: // 1. Address Record
case kDNSType_NULL: // 10 NULL RR
case kDNSType_WKS: // 11 Well-known-service
case kDNSType_HINFO: // 13 Host information
case kDNSType_TXT: // 16 Arbitrary text string
case kDNSType_X25: // 19 X_25 calling address
case kDNSType_ISDN: // 20 ISDN calling address
case kDNSType_NSAP: // 22 NSAP address
case kDNSType_KEY: // 25 Security key
case kDNSType_GPOS: // 27 Geographical position (withdrawn)
case kDNSType_AAAA: // 28 IPv6 Address
case kDNSType_LOC: // 29 Location Information
case kDNSType_EID: // 31 Endpoint identifier
case kDNSType_NIMLOC: // 32 Nimrod Locator
case kDNSType_ATMA: // 34 ATM Address
case kDNSType_CERT: // 37 Certification record
case kDNSType_A6: // 38 IPv6 Address (deprecated)
case kDNSType_SINK: // 40 Kitchen sink (experimental)
case kDNSType_OPT: // 41 EDNS0 option (meta-RR)
case kDNSType_APL: // 42 Address Prefix List
case kDNSType_DS: // 43 Delegation Signer
case kDNSType_SSHFP: // 44 SSH Key Fingerprint
case kDNSType_IPSECKEY: // 45 IPSECKEY
case kDNSType_RRSIG: // 46 RRSIG
case kDNSType_NSEC: // 47 Denial of Existence
case kDNSType_DNSKEY: // 48 DNSKEY
case kDNSType_DHCID: // 49 DHCP Client Identifier
case kDNSType_NSEC3: // 50 Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
case kDNSType_NSEC3PARAM: // 51 Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
case kDNSType_HIP: // 55 Host Identity Protocol
case kDNSType_SPF: // 99 Sender Policy Framework for E-Mail
default:
return rdata_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, r1->rdlength, r2->rdlength);
case kDNSType_NS: // 2 Name Server
case kDNSType_MD: // 3 Mail Destination
case kDNSType_MF: // 4 Mail Forwarder
case kDNSType_CNAME: // 5 Canonical Name
case kDNSType_MB: // 7 Mailbox
case kDNSType_MG: // 8 Mail Group
case kDNSType_MR: // 9 Mail Rename
case kDNSType_PTR: // 12 Domain name pointer
case kDNSType_NSAP_PTR: // 23 Reverse NSAP lookup (deprecated)
case kDNSType_DNAME: // 39 Non-terminal DNAME (for IPv6)
return name_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, r1->rdlength, r2->rdlength);
case kDNSType_SRV: // 33 Service record
return srv_compare(r1, r2);
case kDNSType_SOA: // 6 Start of Authority
return soa_compare(r1, r2);
case kDNSType_RP: // 17 Responsible person
case kDNSType_MINFO: // 14 Mailbox information
return dom2_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, r1->rdlength, r2->rdlength);
case kDNSType_MX: // 15 Mail Exchanger
case kDNSType_AFSDB: // 18 AFS cell database
case kDNSType_RT: // 21 Router
case kDNSType_KX: // 36 Key Exchange
return mx_compare(r1, r2);
case kDNSType_PX: // 26 X.400 mail mapping
return px_compare(r1, r2);
case kDNSType_NAPTR: // 35 Naming Authority PoinTeR
return naptr_compare(r1, r2);
case kDNSType_TKEY: // 249 Transaction key
case kDNSType_TSIG: // 250 Transaction signature
// TSIG and TKEY have a domainname followed by data
return tsig_compare(r1, r2);
// TBD: We are comparing them as opaque types, perhaps not right
case kDNSType_SIG: // 24 Security signature
case kDNSType_NXT: // 30 Next domain (security)
LogMsg("RDATACompare: WARNING!! explicit support has not been added, using default");
return rdata_compare(r1->rdata, r2->rdata, r1->rdlength, r2->rdlength);
}
}
// RFC 4034 section 6.2 requirement for verifying signature.
//
// 3. if the type of the RR is NS, MD, MF, CNAME, SOA, MB, MG, MR, PTR,
// HINFO, MINFO, MX, HINFO, RP, AFSDB, RT, SIG, PX, NXT, NAPTR, KX,
// SRV, DNAME, A6, RRSIG, or NSEC, all uppercase US-ASCII letters in
// the DNS names contained within the RDATA are replaced by the
// corresponding lowercase US-ASCII letters;
//
// NSEC and HINFO is not needed as per dnssec-bis update. RRSIG is done elsewhere
// as part of signature verification
mDNSlocal void ConvertRDATAToCanonical(mDNSu16 rrtype, mDNSu16 rdlength, mDNSu8 *rdata)
{
domainname name;
int len;
mDNSu8 *origRdata = rdata;
// Ensure that we have at least one byte of data to examine and modify.
if (!rdlength) { LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: rdlength zero for rrtype %s", DNSTypeName(rrtype)); return; }
switch (rrtype)
{
// Not adding suppot for A6 as it is deprecated
case kDNSType_A6: // 38 IPv6 Address (deprecated)
default:
debugdnssec("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: returning from default %s", DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
case kDNSType_NS: // 2 Name Server
case kDNSType_MD: // 3 Mail Destination
case kDNSType_MF: // 4 Mail Forwarder
case kDNSType_CNAME: // 5 Canonical Name
case kDNSType_MB: // 7 Mailbox
case kDNSType_MG: // 8 Mail Group
case kDNSType_MR: // 9 Mail Rename
case kDNSType_PTR: // 12 Domain name pointer
case kDNSType_DNAME: // 39 Non-terminal DNAME (for IPv6)
case kDNSType_NXT: // 30 Next domain (security)
// TSIG and TKEY are not mentioned in RFC 4034, but we just leave it here
case kDNSType_TSIG: // 250 Transaction signature
case kDNSType_TKEY: // 249 Transaction key
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)rdata, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)rdata, &name);
return;
case kDNSType_MX: // 15 Mail Exchanger
case kDNSType_AFSDB: // 18 AFS cell database
case kDNSType_RT: // 21 Router
case kDNSType_KX: // 36 Key Exchange
// format: preference - 2 bytes, followed by name
// Ensure that we have at least 3 bytes (preference + 1 byte for the domain name)
if (rdlength <= 3)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:MX: rdlength %d for rrtype %s too small", rdlength, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)(rdata + 2), &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: MX: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)(rdata + 2), &name);
return;
case kDNSType_SRV: // 33 Service record
// format : priority, weight and port - 6 bytes, followed by name
if (rdlength <= 7)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:SRV: rdlength %d for rrtype %s too small", rdlength, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)(rdata + 6), &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: SRV: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)(rdata + 6), &name);
return;
case kDNSType_PX: // 26 X.400 mail mapping
if (rdlength <= 3)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:PX: rdlength %d for rrtype %s too small", rdlength, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
// Preference followed by two domain names
rdata += 2;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case kDNSType_RP: // 17 Responsible person
case kDNSType_SOA: // 6 Start of Authority
case kDNSType_MINFO: // 14 Mailbox information
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)rdata, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: SOA1: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)rdata, &name);
len = DomainNameLength((domainname *)rdata);
if (rdlength <= len + 1)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:RP: rdlength %d for rrtype %s too small", rdlength, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
rdata += len;
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)rdata, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: SOA2: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)rdata, &name);
return;
case kDNSType_NAPTR: // 35 Naming Authority Pointer
// order and preference
rdata += 4;
// Flags (including the length byte)
rdata += (((int) rdata[0]) + 1);
// Service (including the length byte)
rdata += (((int) rdata[0]) + 1);
// regexp (including the length byte)
rdata += (((int) rdata[0]) + 1);
// Replacement field is a domainname. If we have at least one more byte, then we are okay.
if ((origRdata + rdlength) < rdata + 1)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:NAPTR: origRdata %p, rdlength %d, rdata %p for rrtype %s too small", origRdata, rdlength, rdata, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)rdata, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: NAPTR2: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)rdata, &name);
case kDNSType_SIG: // 24 Security signature
// format: <18 bytes> <domainname> <data>
if (rdlength <= 19)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical:SIG: rdlength %d for rrtype %s too small", rdlength, DNSTypeName(rrtype));
return;
}
// Preference followed by two domain names
rdata += 18;
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)rdata, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ConvertRDATAToCanonical: SIG: ERROR!! DNSNameToLowerCase failed");
return;
}
AssignDomainName((domainname *)rdata, &name);
return;
}
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool ValidateSignatureWithKey(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifier *rrset, RRVerifier *keyv, RRVerifier *sig)
{
domainname name;
domainname signerName;
int labels;
mDNSu8 fixedPart[MAX_DOMAIN_NAME + 8]; // domainname + type + class + ttl
int fixedPartLen;
RRVerifier *tmp;
int nrrsets;
rdataComp *ptr, *start, *p;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
rdataDNSKey *key;
int i;
int sigNameLen;
mDNSu16 temp;
mStatus algRet;
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)sig->rdata;
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKey: Validating signature with key with tag %d", (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength));
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, &signerName) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ValidateSignatureWithKey: ERROR!! cannot convert signer name to lower case");
return mDNSfalse;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)&rrset->name, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ValidateSignatureWithKey: ERROR!! cannot convert rrset name to lower case");
return mDNSfalse;
}
sigNameLen = DomainNameLength(&signerName);
labels = CountLabels(&name);
// RFC 4034: RRSIG validation
//
// signature = sign(RRSIG_RDATA | RR(1) | RR(2)... )
//
// where RRSIG_RDATA excludes the signature and signer name in canonical form
if (dv->ctx) AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = AlgCreate(CRYPTO_ALG, rrsig->alg);
if (!dv->ctx)
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKey: ERROR!! No algorithm support for %d", rrsig->alg);
return mDNSfalse;
}
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)rrsig, RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE);
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, signerName.c, sigNameLen);
if (labels - rrsig->labels > 0)
{
domainname *d;
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKey: ====splitting labels %d, rrsig->labels %d====", labels,rrsig->labels);
d = (domainname *)SkipLeadingLabels(&name, labels - rrsig->labels);
fixedPart[0] = 1;
fixedPart[1] = '*';
AssignDomainName((domainname *)(fixedPart + 2), d);
fixedPartLen = DomainNameLength(d) + 2;
// See RFC 4034 section 3.1.3. If you are looking up *.example.com,
// the labels count in the RRSIG is 2, but this is not considered as
// a wildcard answer
if (name.c[0] != 1 || name.c[1] != '*')
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKey: Wildcard exapnded answer for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
dv->flags |= WILDCARD_PROVES_ANSWER_EXPANDED;
dv->wildcardName = (domainname *)SkipLeadingLabels(&dv->origName, labels - rrsig->labels);
if (!dv->wildcardName) return mDNSfalse;
}
}
else
{
debugdnssec("ValidateSignatureWithKey: assigning domainname");
AssignDomainName((domainname *)fixedPart, &name);
fixedPartLen = DomainNameLength(&name);
}
temp = swap16(rrset->rrtype);
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(fixedPart + fixedPartLen, (mDNSu8 *)&temp, sizeof(rrset->rrtype));
fixedPartLen += sizeof(rrset->rrtype);
temp = swap16(rrset->rrclass);
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(fixedPart + fixedPartLen, (mDNSu8 *)&temp, sizeof(rrset->rrclass));
fixedPartLen += sizeof(rrset->rrclass);
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(fixedPart + fixedPartLen, (mDNSu8 *)&rrsig->origTTL, sizeof(rrsig->origTTL));
fixedPartLen += sizeof(rrsig->origTTL);
for (tmp = rrset, nrrsets = 0; tmp; tmp = tmp->next)
nrrsets++;
tmp = rrset;
start = ptr = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(nrrsets * sizeof (rdataComp));
debugdnssec("ValidateSignatureWithKey: start %p, nrrsets %d", start, nrrsets);
if (ptr)
{
// Need to initialize for failure case below
mDNSPlatformMemZero(ptr, nrrsets * (sizeof (rdataComp)));
while (tmp)
{
ptr->rdlength = tmp->rdlength;
ptr->rrtype = tmp->rrtype;
if (ptr->rdlength)
{
ptr->rdata = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(ptr->rdlength);
if (ptr->rdata)
{
mDNSPlatformMemCopy(ptr->rdata, tmp->rdata, tmp->rdlength);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < nrrsets; i++)
if (start[i].rdata) mDNSPlatformMemFree(start[i].rdata);
mDNSPlatformMemFree(start);
LogMsg("ValidateSignatureWithKey:1: ERROR!! RDATA memory alloation failure");
return mDNSfalse;
}
}
ptr++;
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
else
{
LogMsg("ValidateSignatureWithKey:2: ERROR!! RDATA memory alloation failure");
return mDNSfalse;
}
PrintFixedSignInfo(rrsig, &signerName, sigNameLen, fixedPart, fixedPartLen);
mDNSPlatformQsort(start, nrrsets, sizeof(rdataComp), RDATACompare);
for (p = start, i = 0; i < nrrsets; p++, i++)
{
int rdlen;
// The array is sorted and hence checking adjacent entries for duplicate is sufficient
if (i > 0)
{
rdataComp *q = p - 1;
if (!RDATACompare((void *)p, (void *)q)) continue;
}
// Add the fixed part
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)fixedPart, fixedPartLen);
// Add the rdlength
rdlen = swap16(p->rdlength);
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)&rdlen, sizeof(mDNSu16));
ConvertRDATAToCanonical(p->rrtype, p->rdlength, p->rdata);
PrintVarSignInfo(rdlen, p->rdata);
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)p->rdata, p->rdlength);
}
// free the memory as we don't need it anymore
for (i = 0; i < nrrsets; i++)
if (start[i].rdata) mDNSPlatformMemFree(start[i].rdata);
mDNSPlatformMemFree(start);
algRet = AlgVerify(dv->ctx, (mDNSu8 *)&key->data, keyv->rdlength - DNSKEY_FIXED_SIZE, (mDNSu8 *)(sig->rdata + sigNameLen + RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE), sig->rdlength - RRSIG_FIXED_SIZE - sigNameLen);
AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = mDNSNULL;
if (algRet != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKey: AlgVerify failed for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
// Reset the state if we set any above.
if (dv->flags & WILDCARD_PROVES_ANSWER_EXPANDED)
{
dv->flags &= ~WILDCARD_PROVES_ANSWER_EXPANDED;
dv->wildcardName = mDNSNULL;
}
return mDNSfalse;
}
return mDNStrue;
}
// Walk all the keys and for each key walk all the RRSIGS that signs the original rrset
mDNSlocal mStatus ValidateSignature(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifier **resultKey, RRVerifier **resultRRSIG)
{
RRVerifier *rrset;
RRVerifier *keyv;
RRVerifier *rrsigv;
RRVerifier *sig;
rdataDNSKey *key;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
mDNSu16 tag;
rrset = dv->rrset;
sig = dv->rrsig;
for (keyv = dv->key; keyv; keyv = keyv->next)
{
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
for (rrsigv = sig; rrsigv; rrsigv = rrsigv->next)
{
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)rrsigv->rdata;
// 7. The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name, Algorithm, and Key Tag fields MUST match the owner
// name, algorithm, and key tag for some DNSKEY RR in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset.
if (!SameDomainName((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, &keyv->name))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateSignature: name mismatch");
continue;
}
if (key->alg != rrsig->alg)
{
debugdnssec("ValidateSignature: alg mismatch");
continue;
}
if (tag != swap16(rrsig->keyTag))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateSignature: keyTag mismatch rrsig tag %d(0x%x), keyTag %d(0x%x)", swap16(rrsig->keyTag),
swap16(rrsig->keyTag), tag, tag);
continue;
}
// 8. The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, and MUST
// have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7) set.
if (!((swap16(key->flags)) & DNSKEY_ZONE_SIGN_KEY))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateSignature: ZONE flag bit not set");
continue;
}
debugdnssec("ValidateSignature:Found a key and RRSIG tag: %d", tag);
if (ValidateSignatureWithKey(dv, rrset, keyv, rrsigv))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignature: Validated successfully with key tag %d", tag);
*resultKey = keyv;
*resultRRSIG = rrsigv;
return mStatus_NoError;
}
}
}
*resultKey = mDNSNULL;
*resultRRSIG = mDNSNULL;
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool ValidateSignatureWithKeyForAllRRSigs(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifier *rrset, RRVerifier *keyv, RRVerifier *sig)
{
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
mDNSu16 tag;
while (sig)
{
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)sig->rdata;
tag = (mDNSu16)keytag(keyv->rdata, keyv->rdlength);
if (tag == swap16(rrsig->keyTag))
{
if (ValidateSignatureWithKey(dv, rrset, keyv, sig))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateSignatureWithKeyForAllRRSigs: Validated");
return mDNStrue;
}
}
sig = sig->next;
}
return mDNSfalse;
}
mDNSlocal mStatus ValidateDS(DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
mDNSu8 *digest;
int digestLen;
domainname name;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
rdataDS *ds;
rdataDNSKey *key;
RRVerifier *keyv;
RRVerifier *dsv;
mStatus algRet;
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
// Walk all the DS Records to see if we have a matching DNS KEY record that verifies
// the hash. If we find one, verify that this key was used to sign the KEY rrsets in
// this zone. Loop till we find one.
for (dsv = dv->ds; dsv; dsv = dsv->next)
{
ds = (rdataDS *)dsv->rdata;
if ((ds->digestType != SHA1_DIGEST_TYPE) && (ds->digestType != SHA256_DIGEST_TYPE))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateDS: Unsupported digest %d", ds->digestType);
return mStatus_BadParamErr;
}
else debugdnssec("ValidateDS: digest type %d", ds->digestType);
for (keyv = dv->key; keyv; keyv = keyv->next)
{
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
mDNSu16 tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
if (tag != swap16(ds->keyTag))
{
debugdnssec("ValidateDS:Not a valid keytag %d", tag);
continue;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("ValidateDS: ERROR!! cannot convert to lower case");
continue;
}
if (dv->ctx) AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = AlgCreate(DIGEST_ALG, ds->digestType);
if (!dv->ctx)
{
LogMsg("ValidateDS: ERROR!! Cannot allocate context");
continue;
}
digest = (mDNSu8 *)&ds->digest;
digestLen = dsv->rdlength - DS_FIXED_SIZE;
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, name.c, DomainNameLength(&name));
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
algRet = AlgVerify(dv->ctx, mDNSNULL, 0, digest, digestLen);
AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = mDNSNULL;
if (algRet == mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateDS: DS Validated Successfully, need to verify the key %d", tag);
// We found the DNS KEY that is authenticated by the DS in our parent zone. Check to see if this key
// was used to sign the DNS KEY RRSET. If so, then the keys in our DNS KEY RRSET are valid
if (ValidateSignatureWithKeyForAllRRSigs(dv, dv->key, keyv, dv->rrsigKey))
{
LogDNSSEC("ValidateDS: DS Validated Successfully %d", tag);
return mStatus_NoError;
}
}
}
}
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool UnlinkRRVerifier(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifier *elem, RRVerifierSet set)
{
RRVerifier **v;
switch (set)
{
case RRVS_rr:
v = &dv->rrset;
break;
case RRVS_rrsig:
v = &dv->rrsig;
break;
case RRVS_key:
v = &dv->key;
break;
case RRVS_rrsig_key:
v = &dv->rrsigKey;
break;
case RRVS_ds:
v = &dv->ds;
break;
default:
LogMsg("UnlinkRRVerifier: ERROR!! default case %d", set);
return mDNSfalse;
}
while (*v && *v != elem)
v = &(*v)->next;
if (!(*v))
{
LogMsg("UnlinkRRVerifier: ERROR!! cannot find element in set %d", set);
return mDNSfalse;
}
*v = elem->next; // Cut this record from the list
elem->next = mDNSNULL;
return mDNStrue;
}
// This can link a single AuthChain element or a list of AuthChain elements to
// DNSSECVerifier. The latter happens when we have multiple NSEC proofs and
// we gather up all the proofs in one place.
mDNSexport void AuthChainLink(DNSSECVerifier *dv, AuthChain *ae)
{
AuthChain *head;
LogDNSSEC("AuthChainLink: called");
head = ae;
// Get to the last element
while (ae->next)
ae = ae->next;
*(dv->actail) = head; // Append this record to tail of auth chain
dv->actail = &(ae->next); // Advance tail pointer
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool AuthChainAdd(DNSSECVerifier *dv, RRVerifier *resultKey, RRVerifier *resultRRSig)
{
AuthChain *ae;
rdataDNSKey *key;
mDNSu16 tag;
if (!dv->rrset || !resultKey || !resultRRSig)
{
LogMsg("AuthChainAdd: ERROR!! input argument NULL");
return mDNSfalse;
}
// Unlink resultKey and resultRRSig and store as part of AuthChain
if (!UnlinkRRVerifier(dv, resultKey, RRVS_key))
{
LogMsg("AuthChainAdd: ERROR!! cannot unlink key");
return mDNSfalse;
}
if (!UnlinkRRVerifier(dv, resultRRSig, RRVS_rrsig))
{
LogMsg("AuthChainAdd: ERROR!! cannot unlink rrsig");
return mDNSfalse;
}
ae = mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof(AuthChain));
if (!ae)
{
LogMsg("AuthChainAdd: AuthChain alloc failure");
return mDNSfalse;
}
ae->next = mDNSNULL;
ae->rrset = dv->rrset;
dv->rrset = mDNSNULL;
ae->rrsig = resultRRSig;
ae->key = resultKey;
key = (rdataDNSKey *)resultKey->rdata;
tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, resultKey->rdlength);
LogDNSSEC("AuthChainAdd: inserting AuthChain element with rrset %##s (%s), DNSKEY tag %d", ae->rrset->name.c, DNSTypeName(ae->rrset->rrtype), tag);
AuthChainLink(dv, ae);
return mDNStrue;
}
// RFC 4035: Section 5.3.3
//
// If the resolver accepts the RRset as authentic, the validator MUST set the TTL of
// the RRSIG RR and each RR in the authenticated RRset to a value no greater than the
// minimum of:
//
// o the RRset's TTL as received in the response;
//
// o the RRSIG RR's TTL as received in the response;
//
// o the value in the RRSIG RR's Original TTL field; and
//
// o the difference of the RRSIG RR's Signature Expiration time and the
// current time.
mDNSlocal void SetTTLRRSet(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, DNSSECStatus status)
{
DNSQuestion question;
CacheRecord *rr;
RRVerifier *rrsigv;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
CacheGroup *cg;
mDNSu32 rrTTL, rrsigTTL, rrsigOrigTTL, rrsigTimeTTL;
domainname *qname;
mDNSu16 qtype;
CacheRecord *rrsigRR;
mDNSs32 now;
debugdnssec("SetTTLRRSet called");
if (status == DNSSEC_Insecure || status == DNSSEC_Indeterminate)
{
LogDNSSEC("SetTTLRRSET: not setting ttl for status %s", DNSSECStatusName(status));
return;
}
mDNS_Lock(m);
now = m->timenow;
mDNS_Unlock(m);
mDNSPlatformMemZero(&question, sizeof(DNSQuestion));
rrTTL = rrsigTTL = rrsigOrigTTL = rrsigTimeTTL = 0;
// 1. Locate the rrset name and get its TTL (take the first one as a representative
// of the rrset). Ideally, we should set the TTL on the first validation. Instead,
// we do it whenever we validate which happens whenever a ValidationRequired question
// finishes validation.
qname = &dv->origName;
qtype = dv->origType;
question.ThisQInterval = -1;
InitializeQuestion(m, &question, dv->InterfaceID, qname, qtype, mDNSNULL, mDNSNULL);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, question.qnamehash, &question.qname);
if (!cg)
{
LogMsg("SetTTLRRSet cg NULL for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
return;
}
for (rr = cg->members; rr; rr = rr->next)
if (SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion(&rr->resrec, &question))
{
// originalttl is never touched. The actual TTL is derived based on when it was
// received.
rrTTL = rr->resrec.rroriginalttl - (now - rr->TimeRcvd)/mDNSPlatformOneSecond;
break;
}
// Should we check to see if it matches the record in dv->ac->rrset ?
if (!rr)
{
LogMsg("SetTTLRRSet: ERROR!! cannot locate main rrset for %##s (%s)", qname->c, DNSTypeName(qtype));
return;
}
// 2. Get the RRSIG ttl. For NSEC records we need to get the NSEC record's TTL as
// the negative cache record that we created may not be right.
if (dv->ac && dv->ac->rrsig)
{
rrsigv = dv->ac->rrsig;
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)rrsigv->rdata;
}
else
{
rrsigv = mDNSNULL;
rrsig = mDNSNULL;
}
rrsigRR = mDNSNULL;
if (rr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative && status == DNSSEC_Secure)
{
CacheRecord *ncr;
rrTTL = 0;
for (ncr = rr->nsec; ncr; ncr = ncr->next)
{
if (ncr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC || ncr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC3)
{
rrTTL = ncr->resrec.rroriginalttl - (now - ncr->TimeRcvd)/mDNSPlatformOneSecond;
debugdnssec("SetTTLRRSet: NSEC TTL %u", rrTTL);
}
// Note: we can't use dv->origName here as the NSEC record's RRSIG may not match
// the original name
if (rrsigv && ncr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_RRSIG && SameDomainName(ncr->resrec.name, &rrsigv->name))
{
RDataBody2 *rdb = (RDataBody2 *)ncr->resrec.rdata->u.data;
rdataRRSig *sig = (rdataRRSig *)rdb->data;
if (rrsigv->rdlength != ncr->resrec.rdlength)
{
debugdnssec("SetTTLRRSet length mismatch");
continue;
}
if (mDNSPlatformMemSame(sig, rrsig, rrsigv->rdlength))
{
mDNSu32 remain = (now - ncr->TimeRcvd)/mDNSPlatformOneSecond;
rrsigTTL = ncr->resrec.rroriginalttl - remain;
rrsigOrigTTL = swap32(rrsig->origTTL) - remain;
rrsigTimeTTL = swap32(rrsig->sigExpireTime) - swap32(rrsig->sigInceptTime);
}
}
if (rrTTL && (!rrsigv || rrsigTTL)) break;
}
}
else if (rrsigv)
{
// Look for the matching RRSIG so that we can get its TTL
for (rr = cg ? cg->members : mDNSNULL; rr; rr=rr->next)
if (rr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_RRSIG && SameDomainName(rr->resrec.name, &rrsigv->name))
{
RDataBody2 *rdb = (RDataBody2 *)rr->resrec.rdata->u.data;
rdataRRSig *sig = (rdataRRSig *)rdb->data;
if (rrsigv->rdlength != rr->resrec.rdlength)
{
debugdnssec("SetTTLRRSet length mismatch");
continue;
}
if (mDNSPlatformMemSame(sig, rrsig, rrsigv->rdlength))
{
mDNSu32 remain = (now - rr->TimeRcvd)/mDNSPlatformOneSecond;
rrsigTTL = rr->resrec.rroriginalttl - remain;
rrsigOrigTTL = swap32(rrsig->origTTL) - remain;
rrsigTimeTTL = swap32(rrsig->sigExpireTime) - swap32(rrsig->sigInceptTime);
rrsigRR = rr;
break;
}
}
}
// It is possible that there are no RRSIGs and in that case it is not an error
// to find the rrsigTTL.
if (!rrTTL || (rrsigv && (!rrsigTTL || !rrsigOrigTTL || !rrsigTimeTTL)))
{
LogDNSSEC("SetTTLRRSet: ERROR!! Bad TTL rrtl %u, rrsigTTL %u, rrsigOrigTTL %u, rrsigTimeTTL %u for %##s (%s)",
rrTTL, rrsigTTL, rrsigOrigTTL, rrsigTimeTTL, qname->c, DNSTypeName(qtype));
return;
}
LogDNSSEC("SetTTLRRSet: TTL rrtl %u, rrsigTTL %u, rrsigOrigTTL %u, rrsigTimeTTL %u for %##s (%s)",
rrTTL, rrsigTTL, rrsigOrigTTL, rrsigTimeTTL, qname->c, DNSTypeName(qtype));
if (status == DNSSEC_Bogus)
{
rrTTL = RR_BOGUS_TTL;
LogDNSSEC("SetTTLRRSet: setting to bogus TTL %d", rrTTL);
}
if (rrsigv)
{
if (rrsigTTL < rrTTL)
rrTTL = rrsigTTL;
if (rrsigOrigTTL < rrTTL)
rrTTL = rrsigOrigTTL;
if (rrsigTimeTTL < rrTTL)
rrTTL = rrsigTimeTTL;
}
// Set the rrsig's TTL. For NSEC records, rrsigRR is NULL which means it expires when
// the negative cache record expires.
if (rrsigRR)
{
rrsigRR->resrec.rroriginalttl = rrTTL;
rrsigRR->TimeRcvd = now;
rrsigRR->UnansweredQueries = 0;
}
// Find the RRset and set its TTL
for (rr = cg ? cg->members : mDNSNULL; rr; rr=rr->next)
{
if (SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion(&rr->resrec, &question))
{
LogDNSSEC("SetTTLRRSet: Setting the TTL %d for %s, question %##s (%s)", rrTTL, CRDisplayString(m, rr),
question.qname.c, DNSTypeName(rr->resrec.rrtype));
rr->resrec.rroriginalttl = rrTTL;
rr->TimeRcvd = now;
rr->UnansweredQueries = 0;
SetNextCacheCheckTimeForRecord(m, rr);
}
}
}
mDNSlocal void FinishDNSSECVerification(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
RRVerifier *resultKey;
RRVerifier *resultRRSig;
LogDNSSEC("FinishDNSSECVerification: all rdata sets available for sig verification for %##s (%s)",
dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
// Stop outstanding query if one exists
if (dv->q.ThisQInterval != -1)
mDNS_StopQuery(m, &dv->q);
if (ValidateSignature(dv, &resultKey, &resultRRSig) == mStatus_NoError)
{
rdataDNSKey *key;
mDNSu16 tag;
key = (rdataDNSKey *)resultKey->rdata;
tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, resultKey->rdlength);
LogDNSSEC("FinishDNSSECVerification: RRSIG validated by DNSKEY tag %d, %##s (%s)", tag, dv->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype));
if (TrustedKey(m, dv) == mStatus_NoError)
{
// Need to call this after we called TrustedKey, as AuthChainAdd
// unlinks the resultKey and resultRRSig
if (!AuthChainAdd(dv, resultKey, resultRRSig))
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
// The callback will be called when NSEC verification is done.
if ((dv->flags & WILDCARD_PROVES_ANSWER_EXPANDED))
{
WildcardAnswerProof(m, dv);
return;
}
else
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Secure);
return;
}
}
if (!ValidateDS(dv))
{
// Need to call this after we called ValidateDS, as AuthChainAdd
// unlinks the resultKey and resultRRSig
if (!AuthChainAdd(dv, resultKey, resultRRSig))
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
FreeDNSSECVerifierRRSets(dv);
dv->recursed++;
if (dv->recursed < MAX_RECURSE_COUNT)
{
LogDNSSEC("FinishDNSSECVerification: Recursion level %d for %##s (%s)", dv->recursed, dv->origName.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
VerifySignature(m, dv, &dv->q);
return;
}
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("FinishDNSSECVerification: ValidateDS failed %##s (%s)", dv->rrset->name.c, DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype));
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("FinishDNSSECVerification: Could not validate the rrset %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
}
mDNSexport void StartDNSSECVerification(mDNS *const m, void *context)
{
mDNSBool done;
DNSSECVerifier *dv = (DNSSECVerifier *)context;
done = GetAllRRSetsForVerification(m, dv);
if (done)
{
if (dv->next != RRVS_done)
LogMsg("StartDNSSECVerification: ERROR!! dv->next is not done");
else
LogDNSSEC("StartDNSSECVerification: all rdata sets available for sig verification");
FinishDNSSECVerification(m, dv);
return;
}
else debugdnssec("StartDNSSECVerification: all rdata sets not available for sig verification next %d", dv->next);
}
mDNSexport char *DNSSECStatusName(DNSSECStatus status)
{
switch (status)
{
case DNSSEC_Secure: return "Secure";
case DNSSEC_Insecure: return "Insecure";
case DNSSEC_Indeterminate: return "Indeterminate";
case DNSSEC_Bogus: return "Bogus";
default: return "Invalid";
}
}
// We could not use GenerateNegativeResponse as it assumes m->CurrentQuestion to be set. Even if
// we change that, we needs to fix its callers and so on. It is much simpler to call the callback.
mDNSlocal void DeliverDNSSECStatus(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, ResourceRecord *answer, DNSSECStatus status)
{
// Can't use m->CurrentQuestion as it may already be in use
if (m->ValidationQuestion)
LogMsg("DeliverDNSSECStatus: ERROR!! m->ValidationQuestion already set: %##s (%s)",
m->ValidationQuestion->qname.c, DNSTypeName(m->ValidationQuestion->qtype));
BumpDNSSECStats(m, kStatsActionSet, kStatsTypeStatus, status);
BumpDNSSECStats(m, kStatsActionSet, kStatsTypeExtraPackets, dv->NumPackets);
mDNS_Lock(m);
BumpDNSSECStats(m, kStatsActionSet, kStatsTypeLatency, m->timenow - dv->StartTime);
mDNS_Unlock(m);
m->ValidationQuestion = m->Questions;
while (m->ValidationQuestion && m->ValidationQuestion != m->NewQuestions)
{
DNSQuestion *q = m->ValidationQuestion;
if (q->ValidatingResponse || !q->ValidationRequired ||
(q->ValidationState != DNSSECValInProgress) || !ResourceRecordAnswersQuestion(answer, q))
{
m->ValidationQuestion = q->next;
continue;
}
q->ValidationState = DNSSECValDone;
q->ValidationStatus = status;
MakeNegativeCacheRecord(m, &largerec.r, &q->qname, q->qnamehash, q->qtype, q->qclass, 60, mDNSInterface_Any, mDNSNULL);
if (q->qtype == answer->rrtype || status != DNSSEC_Secure)
{
LogDNSSEC("DeliverDNSSECStatus: Generating dnssec status %s for %##s (%s)", DNSSECStatusName(status),
q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype));
if (q->QuestionCallback)
{
if (q->DNSSECAuthInfo)
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo((AuthChain *)q->DNSSECAuthInfo);
q->DNSSECAuthInfo = AuthChainCopy(dv->ac);
q->DAIFreeCallback = FreeAuthChain;
q->QuestionCallback(m, q, &largerec.r.resrec, QC_dnssec);
}
}
else if (FollowCNAME(q, answer, QC_add))
{
LogDNSSEC("DeliverDNSSECStatus: Following CNAME dnssec status %s for %##s (%s)", DNSSECStatusName(status),
q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype));
mDNS_Lock(m);
AnswerQuestionByFollowingCNAME(m, q, answer);
mDNS_Unlock(m);
}
if (m->ValidationQuestion == q) // If m->ValidationQuestion was not auto-advanced, do it ourselves now
m->ValidationQuestion = q->next;
}
m->ValidationQuestion = mDNSNULL;
}
// There is no work to be done if we could not validate DNSSEC (as the actual response for
// the query has already been delivered) except in the case of CNAMEs where we did not follow
// CNAMEs until we finished the DNSSEC processing.
mDNSlocal void DNSSECNoResponse(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
mDNSu32 namehash;
ResourceRecord *answer = mDNSNULL;
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNoResponse: called");
if (dv->ValidationRequired != DNSSEC_VALIDATION_SECURE_OPTIONAL)
{
LogMsg("DNSSECNoResponse: ERROR!! ValidationRequired incorrect %d", dv->ValidationRequired);
return;
}
BumpDNSSECStats(m, kStatsActionSet, kStatsTypeStatus, DNSSEC_NoResponse);
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(&dv->origName);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, &dv->origName);
if (!cg)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNoResponse: cg NULL for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, &dv->origName, dv->origType, mDNSNULL, mDNSNULL);
// We don't have to reset ValidatingResponse (unlike in DeliverDNSSECStatus) as there are no
// RRSIGs that can match the original question
for (cr = cg->members; cr; cr = cr->next)
{
if (SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion(&cr->resrec, &dv->q))
{
answer = &cr->resrec;
break;
}
}
// It is not an error for things to disappear underneath
if (!answer)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNoResponse: answer NULL for %##s, %s", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
if (answer->rrtype == kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNoResponse: RRSIG present for %##s, %s", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
// Can't use m->CurrentQuestion as it may already be in use
if (m->ValidationQuestion)
LogMsg("DNSSECNoResponse: ERROR!! m->ValidationQuestion already set: %##s (%s)",
m->ValidationQuestion->qname.c, DNSTypeName(m->ValidationQuestion->qtype));
m->ValidationQuestion = m->Questions;
while (m->ValidationQuestion && m->ValidationQuestion != m->NewQuestions)
{
DNSQuestion *q = m->ValidationQuestion;
if (q->ValidatingResponse || !q->ValidationRequired ||
(q->ValidationState != DNSSECValInProgress) || !ResourceRecordAnswersQuestion(answer, q))
{
m->ValidationQuestion = q->next;
continue;
}
// If we could not validate e.g., zone was not signed or bad delegation etc.,
// disable validation. Ideally, for long outstanding questions, we should try again when
// we switch networks. But for now, keep it simple.
//
// Note: If we followed a CNAME with no dnssec protection, it is even more important that
// we disable validation as we don't want to deliver a "secure" dnssec response later e.g.,
// it is possible that the CNAME is not secure but the address records are secure. In this
// case, we don't want to deliver the secure response later as we followed a CNAME that was
// not protected with DNSSEC.
q->ValidationRequired = 0;
q->ValidationState = DNSSECValNotRequired;
if (FollowCNAME(q, answer, QC_add))
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNoResponse: Following CNAME for %##s (%s)", q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype));
mDNS_Lock(m);
AnswerQuestionByFollowingCNAME(m, q, answer);
mDNS_Unlock(m);
}
if (m->ValidationQuestion == q) // If m->ValidationQuestion was not auto-advanced, do it ourselves now
m->ValidationQuestion = q->next;
}
m->ValidationQuestion = mDNSNULL;
done:
FreeDNSSECVerifier(m, dv);
}
mDNSlocal void DNSSECPositiveValidationCB(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheGroup *cg, ResourceRecord *answer, DNSSECStatus status)
{
RRVerifier *rrset;
RRVerifier *rv;
CacheRecord *cr;
mDNSu16 rrtype, rrclass;
CacheRecord *const lrr = &largerec.r;
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: called %s for %##s (%s)", DNSSECStatusName(status), dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
//
// 1. Check to see if the rrset that was validated is the same as in cache. If they are not same,
// this validation result is not valid. When the rrset changed while the validation was in
// progress, the act of delivering the changed rrset again should have kicked off another
// verification.
//
// 2. Walk the question list to find the matching question. The original question that started
// the DNSSEC verification may or may not be there. As long as there is a matching question
// and waiting for the response, deliver the response.
//
// 3. If we are answering with CNAME, it is time to follow the CNAME if the response is secure
if (!dv->ac || status == DNSSEC_Insecure)
{
// For Insecure status, the auth chain contains information about the trust
// chain starting from the known trust anchor. The rrsets are not related to
// the origName like in Bogus or Secure.
if (!answer)
LogMsg("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: ERROR: answer NULL");
}
else
{
if (!dv->ac->rrset)
{
LogMsg("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: ERROR!! Validated RRSET NULL");
goto done;
}
rrset = dv->ac->rrset;
rrtype = rrset->rrtype;
rrclass = rrset->rrclass;
lrr->resrec.name = &largerec.namestorage;
for (rv = dv->ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
rv->found = 0;
// Check to see if we can find all the elements in the rrset
for (cr = cg ? cg->members : mDNSNULL; cr; cr = cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.rrtype == rrtype && cr->resrec.rrclass == rrclass)
{
for (rv = dv->ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
{
if (rv->rdlength == cr->resrec.rdlength && rv->rdatahash == cr->resrec.rdatahash)
{
lrr->resrec.namehash = rv->namehash;
lrr->resrec.rrtype = rv->rrtype;
lrr->resrec.rrclass = rv->rrclass;
lrr->resrec.rdata = (RData*)&lrr->smallrdatastorage;
lrr->resrec.rdata->MaxRDLength = MaximumRDSize;
// Convert the "rdata" to a suitable form before we can call SameRDataBody which expects
// some of the resource records in host order and also domainnames fully expanded. We
// converted the resource records into network order for verification purpose and hence
// need to convert them back again before comparing them.
if (!SetRData(mDNSNULL, rv->rdata, rv->rdata + rv->rdlength, &largerec, rv->rdlength))
{
LogMsg("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: SetRData failed for %##s (%s)", rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
}
else if (SameRDataBody(&cr->resrec, &lrr->resrec.rdata->u, SameDomainName))
{
answer = &cr->resrec;
rv->found = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!rv)
{
// The validated rrset does not have the element in the cache, re-validate
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: CacheRecord %s, not found in the validated set", CRDisplayString(m, cr));
goto done;
}
}
}
// Check to see if we have elements that were not in the cache
for (rv = dv->ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
{
if (!rv->found)
{
// We had more elements in the validated set, re-validate
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: Record %##s (%s) not found in the cache", rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
goto done;
}
}
}
// It is not an error for things to disappear underneath
if (!answer)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECPositiveValidationCB: answer NULL for %##s, %s", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
DeliverDNSSECStatus(m, dv, answer, status);
SetTTLRRSet(m, dv, status);
done:
FreeDNSSECVerifier(m, dv);
}
mDNSlocal void DNSSECNegativeValidationCB(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, CacheGroup *cg, ResourceRecord *answer, DNSSECStatus status)
{
RRVerifier *rv;
CacheRecord *cr;
mDNSu16 rrtype, rrclass;
AuthChain *ac;
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: called %s for %##s (%s)", DNSSECStatusName(status), dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
if (dv->parent)
{
// When NSEC/NSEC3s validation is completed, it calls the parent's DVCallback with the
// parent DNSSECVerifier which is the original one that started the verification. It itself
// should not have a parent. If the NSEC/NSEC3 validation results in another NSEC/NSEC3
// validation, it should chain up via the dv->parent all the way to the top.
LogMsg("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: ERROR!! dv->parent is set for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
// 1. Locate the negative cache record and check the cached NSEC/NSEC3 records to see if it matches the
// NSEC/NSEC3s that were valiated. If the cached NSEC/NSEC3s changed while the validation was in progress,
// we ignore the validation results.
//
// 2. Walk the question list to find the matching question. The original question that started
// the DNSSEC verification may or may not be there. As long as there is a matching question
// and waiting for the response, deliver the response.
//
if (!dv->ac || status == DNSSEC_Insecure)
{
// For Insecure status, the auth chain contains information about the trust
// chain starting from the known trust anchor. The rrsets are not related to
// the origName like in Bogus or Secure.
if (!answer)
LogMsg("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: ERROR: answer NULL");
}
else
{
if (!dv->ac->rrset)
{
LogMsg("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: ERROR!! Validated RRSET NULL");
goto done;
}
rrtype = dv->origType;
rrclass = dv->ac->rrset->rrclass;
for (ac = dv->ac; ac; ac = ac->next)
{
for (rv = ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
{
if (rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC || rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC3)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: Record %p %##s (%s) marking zero", rv, rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
rv->found = 0;
}
}
}
// Check to see if we can find all the elements in the rrset
for (cr = cg->members; cr; cr = cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative &&
cr->resrec.rrtype == rrtype && cr->resrec.rrclass == rrclass)
{
CacheRecord *ncr;
for (ncr = cr->nsec; ncr; ncr = ncr->next)
{
// We have RRSIGs for the NSECs cached there too
if (ncr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_NSEC && ncr->resrec.rrtype != kDNSType_NSEC3)
continue;
for (ac = dv->ac; ac; ac = ac->next)
{
for (rv = ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
{
if ((rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC || rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC3) && rv->rdlength == ncr->resrec.rdlength &&
rv->rdatahash == ncr->resrec.rdatahash)
{
if (SameDomainName(ncr->resrec.name, &rv->name) &&
SameRDataBody(&ncr->resrec, (const RDataBody *)rv->rdata, SameDomainName))
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: Record %p %##s (%s) marking one", rv, rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
answer = &cr->resrec;
rv->found = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (rv)
break;
}
}
if (!rv)
{
// The validated rrset does not have the element in the cache, re-validate
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: CacheRecord %s, not found in the validated set", CRDisplayString(m, cr));
goto done;
}
}
}
// Check to see if we have elements that were not in the cache
for (ac = dv->ac; ac; ac = ac->next)
{
for (rv = ac->rrset; rv; rv = rv->next)
{
if (rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC || rv->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC3)
{
if (!rv->found)
{
// We had more elements in the validated set, re-validate
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: Record %p %##s (%s) not found in the cache", rv, rv->name.c, DNSTypeName(rv->rrtype));
goto done;
}
rv->found = 0;
}
}
}
}
// It is not an error for things to disappear underneath
if (!answer)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECNegativeValidationCB: answer NULL for %##s, %s", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
goto done;
}
DeliverDNSSECStatus(m, dv, answer, status);
SetTTLRRSet(m, dv, status);
done:
FreeDNSSECVerifier(m, dv);
}
mDNSlocal void DNSSECValidationCB(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, DNSSECStatus status)
{
mDNSu32 namehash;
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECValidationCB: called %s for %##s (%s)", DNSSECStatusName(status), dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
// Currently, if we receive anything other than secure, we abort DNSSEC validation for
// the optional case.
if (dv->ValidationRequired == DNSSEC_VALIDATION_SECURE_OPTIONAL && status != DNSSEC_Secure)
{
DNSSECNoResponse(m, dv);
return;
}
if (dv->ValidationRequired == DNSSEC_VALIDATION_SECURE && !dv->InsecureProofDone && status == DNSSEC_Bogus)
{
dv->InsecureProofDone = 1;
ProveInsecure(m, dv, mDNSNULL, mDNSNULL);
return;
}
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(&dv->origName);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, &dv->origName);
if (!cg)
{
LogDNSSEC("DNSSECValidationCB: cg NULL for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
FreeDNSSECVerifier(m, dv);
return;
}
InitializeQuestion(m, &dv->q, dv->InterfaceID, &dv->origName, dv->origType, mDNSNULL, mDNSNULL);
// Need to be reset ValidatingResponse as we are looking for the cache record that would answer
// the original question
dv->q.ValidatingResponse = mDNSfalse;
for (cr = cg->members; cr; cr = cr->next)
{
if (SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion(&cr->resrec, &dv->q))
{
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
DNSSECNegativeValidationCB(m, dv, cg, &cr->resrec, status);
else
DNSSECPositiveValidationCB(m, dv, cg, &cr->resrec, status);
return;
}
}
}
mDNSexport void VerifySignature(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, DNSQuestion *q)
{
CacheGroup *const cg = CacheGroupForName(m, q->qnamehash, &q->qname);
CacheRecord *rr;
mDNSBool first = mDNSfalse;
static mDNSBool TrustAnchorsUpdated = mDNSfalse;
LogDNSSEC("VerifySignature called for %##s (%s)", q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype));
if (!TrustAnchorsUpdated)
{
TrustAnchorsUpdated = mDNStrue;
UpdateTrustAnchors(m);
}
if (!dv)
{
first = mDNStrue;
if (!q->qDNSServer || q->qDNSServer->cellIntf)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySignature: Disabled");
return;
}
// We assume that the verifier's question has been initialized here so that ValidateWithNSECS below
// knows what it has prove the non-existence of.
dv = AllocateDNSSECVerifier(m, &q->qname, q->qtype, q->InterfaceID, q->ValidationRequired, DNSSECValidationCB, VerifySigCallback);
if (!dv)
{
LogMsg("VerifySignature: ERROR!! memory alloc failed");
return;
}
}
// If we find a CNAME response to the question, remember what qtype
// caused the CNAME response. origType is not sufficient as we
// recursively validate the response and origType is initialized above
// the first time this function is called.
dv->currQtype = q->qtype;
// Walk the cache and get all the rrsets for verification.
for (rr = cg ? cg->members : mDNSNULL; rr; rr=rr->next)
if (SameNameRecordAnswersQuestion(&rr->resrec, q))
{
// We also get called for RRSIGs which matches qtype. We don't need that here as we are
// building rrset for matching q->qname. Checking for RRSIG type is important as otherwise
// we would miss the CNAME answering any qtype.
if (rr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_RRSIG && rr->resrec.rrtype != q->qtype)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySignature: Question %##s (%s) answered with RRSIG record %s, not using it", q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype), CRDisplayString(m, rr));
continue;
}
// See DNSSECRecordAnswersQuestion: This should never happen. NSEC records are
// answered directly only when the qtype is NSEC. Otherwise, NSEC records are
// used only for denial of existence and hence should go through negative cache
// entry.
if (rr->resrec.rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC && q->qtype != kDNSType_NSEC)
{
LogMsg("VerifySignature: ERROR!! Question %##s (%s) answered using NSEC record %s", q->qname.c, DNSTypeName(q->qtype), CRDisplayString(m, rr));
continue;
}
// We might get a NSEC response when we first send the query out from the "core" for ValidationRequired
// questions. Later as part of validating the response, we might get a NSEC response.
if (rr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative && DNSSECQuestion(q))
{
// If we can't find the NSEC, we can't validate. This can happens if we are
// behind a non-DNSSEC aware CPE/server.
if (!rr->nsec)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySignature: No nsecs found for %s", CRDisplayString(m, rr));
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, rr);
return;
}
if (AddRRSetToVerifier(dv, &rr->resrec, mDNSNULL, RRVS_rr) != mStatus_NoError)
{
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
}
if (!dv->rrset)
{
LogMsg("VerifySignature: rrset mDNSNULL for %##s (%s)", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType));
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
dv->next = RRVS_rrsig;
// Delay this so that the mDNS "core" can deliver all the results before
// we can deliver the dnssec result
if (first)
{
mDNSPlatformDispatchAsync(m, dv, StartDNSSECVerification);
}
else
{
StartDNSSECVerification(m, dv);
}
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool TrustedKeyPresent(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
rdataDS *ds;
rdataDNSKey *key;
TrustAnchor *ta;
RRVerifier *keyv;
// Walk all our trusted DS Records to see if we have a matching DNS KEY record that verifies
// the hash. If we find one, verify that this key was used to sign the KEY rrsets in
// this zone. Loop till we find one.
for (ta = m->TrustAnchors; ta; ta = ta->next)
{
ds = (rdataDS *)&ta->rds;
if ((ds->digestType != SHA1_DIGEST_TYPE) && (ds->digestType != SHA256_DIGEST_TYPE))
{
LogMsg("TrustedKeyPresent: Unsupported digest %d", ds->digestType);
continue;
}
else
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKeyPresent: digest type %d", ds->digestType);
}
for (keyv = dv->key; keyv; keyv = keyv->next)
{
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
mDNSu16 tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
if (tag != ds->keyTag)
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKeyPresent:Not a valid keytag %d", tag);
continue;
}
if (!SameDomainName(&keyv->name, &ta->zone))
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKeyPresent: domainame mismatch key %##s, ta %##s", keyv->name.c, ta->zone.c);
continue;
}
return mDNStrue;
}
}
return mDNSfalse;
}
mDNSlocal mStatus TrustedKey(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv)
{
mDNSu8 *digest;
int digestLen;
domainname name;
rdataRRSig *rrsig;
rdataDS *ds;
rdataDNSKey *key;
TrustAnchor *ta;
RRVerifier *keyv;
mStatus algRet;
mDNSu32 currTime = mDNSPlatformUTC();
rrsig = (rdataRRSig *)dv->rrsig->rdata;
// Walk all our trusted DS Records to see if we have a matching DNS KEY record that verifies
// the hash. If we find one, verify that this key was used to sign the KEY rrsets in
// this zone. Loop till we find one.
for (ta = m->TrustAnchors; ta; ta = ta->next)
{
ds = (rdataDS *)&ta->rds;
if ((ds->digestType != SHA1_DIGEST_TYPE) && (ds->digestType != SHA256_DIGEST_TYPE))
{
LogMsg("TrustedKey: Unsupported digest %d", ds->digestType);
continue;
}
else
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKey: Zone %##s, digest type %d, tag %d", ta->zone.c, ds->digestType, ds->keyTag);
}
for (keyv = dv->key; keyv; keyv = keyv->next)
{
key = (rdataDNSKey *)keyv->rdata;
mDNSu16 tag = (mDNSu16)keytag((mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
if (tag != ds->keyTag)
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKey:Not a valid keytag %d", tag);
continue;
}
if (!SameDomainName(&keyv->name, &ta->zone))
{
debugdnssec("TrustedKey: domainame mismatch key %##s, ta %##s", keyv->name.c, ta->zone.c);
continue;
}
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(ta->validUntil, currTime))
{
LogDNSSEC("TrustedKey: Expired: currentTime %d, ExpireTime %d", (int)currTime, ta->validUntil);
continue;
}
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(currTime, ta->validFrom))
{
LogDNSSEC("TrustedKey: Future: currentTime %d, InceptTime %d", (int)currTime, ta->validFrom);
continue;
}
if (DNSNameToLowerCase((domainname *)&rrsig->signerName, &name) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogMsg("TrustedKey: ERROR!! cannot convert to lower case");
continue;
}
if (dv->ctx) AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = AlgCreate(DIGEST_ALG, ds->digestType);
if (!dv->ctx)
{
LogMsg("TrustedKey: ERROR!! No digest support");
continue;
}
digest = ds->digest;
digestLen = ta->digestLen;
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, name.c, DomainNameLength(&name));
AlgAdd(dv->ctx, (const mDNSu8 *)key, keyv->rdlength);
algRet = AlgVerify(dv->ctx, mDNSNULL, 0, digest, digestLen);
AlgDestroy(dv->ctx);
dv->ctx = mDNSNULL;
if (algRet == mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("TrustedKey: DS Validated Successfully, need to verify the key %d", tag);
// We found the DNS KEY that is authenticated by the DS in our parent zone. Check to see if this key
// was used to sign the DNS KEY RRSET. If so, then the keys in our DNS KEY RRSET are valid
if (ValidateSignatureWithKeyForAllRRSigs(dv, dv->key, keyv, dv->rrsigKey))
{
LogDNSSEC("TrustedKey: DS Validated Successfully %d", tag);
return mStatus_NoError;
}
}
}
}
return mStatus_NoSuchRecord;
}
mDNSlocal CacheRecord* NegativeCacheRecordForRR(mDNS *const m, const ResourceRecord *const rr)
{
mDNSu32 namehash;
CacheGroup *cg;
CacheRecord *cr;
namehash = DomainNameHashValue(rr->name);
cg = CacheGroupForName(m, namehash, rr->name);
if (!cg)
{
LogMsg("NegativeCacheRecordForRR: cg null %##s", rr->name->c);
return mDNSNULL;
}
for (cr=cg->members; cr; cr=cr->next)
{
if (cr->resrec.RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative && (&cr->resrec == rr))
return cr;
}
return mDNSNULL;
}
mDNSlocal void VerifySigCallback(mDNS *const m, DNSQuestion *question, const ResourceRecord *const answer, QC_result AddRecord)
{
DNSSECVerifier *dv = (DNSSECVerifier *)question->QuestionContext;
mDNSu16 rrtype;
CacheRecord *negcr;
debugdnssec("VerifySigCallback: AddRecord %d, dv %p", AddRecord, dv);
if (!AddRecord)
return;
// After the first ADD event, we should ideally stop the question. If we don't stop
// the question, we might get more callbacks and that can cause problems. For example,
// in the first callback, we could start a insecure proof and while that is in progress,
// if we get more callbacks, we will try to start another insecure proof. As we already
// started an insecure proof, we won't start another but terminate the verification
// process where we free the current DNSSECVerifier while the first insecure proof is
// still referencing it.
//
// But there are cases below which might return if we have not received the right answer
// yet e.g., no RRSIGs. In that case if the question is stopped, we will never get any
// callbacks again and also we leak "dv". Hence it is important that we either process
// the result or wait for more results. Note that the question eventually times out
// and cleans up the "dv" i.e., we don't wait forever.
if (!answer)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Question %##s (%s) no dnssec response", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback(%p): Called with record %s for question %##s (%s)", dv, RRDisplayString(m, answer), question->qname.c,
DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
mDNS_Lock(m);
if ((m->timenow - question->StopTime) >= 0)
{
mDNS_Unlock(m);
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Question %##s (%s) timed out", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
mDNS_Unlock(m);
if (answer->RecordType == kDNSRecordTypePacketNegative)
{
CacheRecord *cr;
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Received a negative answer with record %s, AddRecord %d",
RRDisplayString(m, answer), AddRecord);
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
cr = NegativeCacheRecordForRR(m, answer);
if (cr && cr->nsec)
{
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, cr);
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Missing record (%s) Negative Cache Record %p", RRDisplayString(m, answer), cr);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
}
return;
}
if (!dv->rrset)
{
LogMsg("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! rrset NULL");
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
rrtype = answer->rrtype;
// Check whether we got any answers for the question. If there are no answers, we
// can't do the verification.
//
// We need to look at the whole rrset for verifying the signatures. This callback gets
// called back for each record in the rrset sequentially and we won't know when to start the
// verification. Hence, we look for all the records in the rrset ourselves using the
// CheckXXX function below. The caller has to ensure that all the records in the rrset are
// added to the cache before calling this callback which happens naturally because all
// unicast records are marked for DelayDelivery and hence added to the cache before the
// callback is done.
//
// We also need the RRSIGs for the rrset to do the validation. It is possible that the
// cache contains RRSIG records but it may not be a valid record when we filter them
// in CheckXXX function. For example, some application can query for RRSIG records which
// might come back with a partial set of RRSIG records from the recursive server and
// they may not be the right ones for the current validation. In this case, we still
// need to send the query out to get the right RRSIGs but the "core" should not answer
// this query with the same records that we checked and found them to be unusable.
//
// We handle this in two ways:
//
// 1) AnswerNewQuestion always sends the "ValidatingResponse" query out bypassing the cache.
//
// 2) DNSSECRecordAnswersQuestion does not answer a question with RRSIGs matching the
// same name as the query until the typeCovered also matches the query's type.
//
// NOTE: We use "next - 1" as next always points to what we are going to fetch next and not the one
// we are fetching currently
switch(dv->next - 1)
{
case RRVS_rr:
// Verification always starts at RRVS_rrsig (which means dv->next points at RRVS_key) as verification does
// not begin until we have the main rrset.
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! rrset %##s dv->next is RRVS_rr", dv->rrset->name.c);
return;
case RRVS_rrsig:
// We can get called back with rrtype matching qtype as new records are added to the cache
// triggered by other questions. This could potentially mean that the rrset that is being
// validated by this "dv" whose rrsets were initialized at the beginning of the verification
// may not be the right one. If this case happens, we will detect this at the end of validation
// and throw away the validation results. This should not be a common case.
if (rrtype != kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_rrsig called with %s", RRDisplayString(m, answer));
return;
}
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
if (CheckRRSIGForRRSet(m, dv, &negcr) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Unable to find RRSIG for %##s (%s), question %##s", dv->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype), question->qname.c);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
break;
case RRVS_key:
// We are waiting for the DNSKEY record and hence dv->key should be NULL. If RRSIGs are being
// returned first, ignore them for now.
if (dv->key)
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! RRVS_key dv->key non-NULL for %##s", question->qname.c);
if (rrtype == kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_key rrset type %s, %##s received before DNSKEY", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c);
return;
}
if (rrtype != question->qtype)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! RRVS_key rrset type %s, %##s not matching qtype %d", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c,
question->qtype);
return;
}
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
if (CheckKeyForRRSIG(m, dv, &negcr) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Unable to find DNSKEY for %##s (%s), question %##s", dv->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype), question->qname.c);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
break;
case RRVS_rrsig_key:
// If we are in RRVS_rrsig_key, it means that we already found the relevant DNSKEYs (dv->key should be non-NULL).
// If DNSKEY record is being returned i.e., it means it is being added to the cache, then it can't be in our
// list.
if (!dv->key)
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! RRVS_rrsig_key dv->key NULL for %##s", question->qname.c);
if (rrtype == question->qtype)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_rrsig_key rrset type %s, %##s", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c);
CheckOneKeyForRRSIG(dv, answer);
return;
}
if (rrtype != kDNSType_RRSIG)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_rrsig_key rrset type %s, %##s not matching qtype %d", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c,
question->qtype);
return;
}
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
if (CheckRRSIGForKey(m, dv, &negcr) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Unable to find RRSIG for %##s (%s), question %##s", dv->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype), question->qname.c);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
break;
case RRVS_ds:
if (rrtype == question->qtype)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_ds rrset type %s, %##s", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c);
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: RRVS_ds rrset type %s, %##s received before DS", DNSTypeName(rrtype), question->qname.c);
}
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
// It is not an error if we don't find the DS record as we could have
// a trusted key. Or this is not a secure delegation which will be handled
// below.
if (CheckDSForKey(m, dv, &negcr) != mStatus_NoError)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: Unable find DS for %##s (%s), question %##s", dv->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(dv->rrset->rrtype), question->qname.c);
}
// dv->next is already at RRVS_done, so if we "break" from here, we will end up
// in FinishDNSSECVerification. We should not do that if we receive a negative
// response. For all other cases above, GetAllRRSetsForVerification handles
// negative cache record
if (negcr)
{
if (!negcr->nsec)
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: No nsec records for %##s (DS)", dv->ds->name.c);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
ValidateWithNSECS(m, dv, negcr);
return;
}
break;
default:
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: ERROR!! default case rrset %##s question %##s", dv->rrset->name.c, question->qname.c);
mDNS_StopQuery(m, question);
dv->DVCallback(m, dv, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
if (dv->next != RRVS_done)
{
mDNSBool done = GetAllRRSetsForVerification(m, dv);
if (done)
{
if (dv->next != RRVS_done)
LogMsg("VerifySigCallback ERROR!! dv->next is not done");
else
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: all rdata sets available for sig verification");
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("VerifySigCallback: all rdata sets not available for sig verification");
return;
}
}
FinishDNSSECVerification(m, dv);
}
mDNSlocal TrustAnchor *FindTrustAnchor(mDNS *const m, const domainname *const name)
{
TrustAnchor *ta;
TrustAnchor *matchTA = mDNSNULL;
TrustAnchor *rootTA = mDNSNULL;
int currmatch = 0;
int match;
mDNSu32 currTime = mDNSPlatformUTC();
for (ta = m->TrustAnchors; ta; ta = ta->next)
{
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(ta->validUntil, currTime))
{
LogDNSSEC("FindTrustAnchor: Expired: currentTime %d, ExpireTime %d", (int)currTime, ta->validUntil);
continue;
}
if (DNS_SERIAL_LT(currTime, ta->validFrom))
{
LogDNSSEC("FindTrustAnchor: Future: currentTime %d, InceptTime %d", (int)currTime, ta->validFrom);
continue;
}
if (SameDomainName((const domainname *)"\000", &ta->zone))
rootTA = ta;
match = CountLabelsMatch(&ta->zone, name);
if (match > currmatch)
{
currmatch = match;
matchTA = ta;
}
}
if (matchTA)
{
LogDNSSEC("FindTrustAnhcor: matched %##s", matchTA->zone.c);
return matchTA;
}
else if (rootTA)
{
LogDNSSEC("FindTrustAnhcor: matched rootTA %##s", rootTA->zone.c);
return rootTA;
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("FindTrustAnhcor: No Trust Anchor");
return mDNSNULL;
}
}
mDNSlocal void DeliverInsecureProofResultAsync(mDNS *const m, void *context)
{
InsecureContext *ic = (InsecureContext *)context;
ic->dv->DVCallback(m, ic->dv, ic->status);
if (ic->q.ThisQInterval != -1)
{
LogMsg("DeliverInsecureProofResultAsync: ERROR!! Question %##s (%s) not stopped already", ic->q.qname.c, DNSTypeName(ic->q.qtype));
mDNS_StopQuery(m, &ic->q);
}
mDNSPlatformMemFree(ic);
}
mDNSlocal void DeliverInsecureProofResult(mDNS *const m, InsecureContext *ic, DNSSECStatus status)
{
// If the status is Bogus, restore the original auth chain before the insecure
// proof.
if (status == DNSSEC_Bogus)
{
LogDNSSEC("DeliverInsecureProofResult: Restoring the auth chain");
if (ic->dv->ac)
{
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(ic->dv->ac);
}
ResetAuthChain(ic->dv);
ic->dv->ac = ic->dv->saveac;
if (ic->dv->ac)
{
AuthChain *tmp = ic->dv->ac;
AuthChain **tail = &tmp->next;
while (tmp->next)
{
tail = &tmp->next;
tmp = tmp->next;
}
ic->dv->actail = tail;
}
ic->dv->saveac = mDNSNULL;
}
else if (ic->dv->saveac)
{
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(ic->dv->saveac);
ic->dv->saveac = mDNSNULL;
}
ic->status = status;
// Stop the question before we schedule the block so that we don't receive additional
// callbacks again. Once the block runs, it will free the "ic" and you can't
// have another block queued up. This can happen if we receive a callback after we
// queue the block below.
if (ic->q.ThisQInterval != -1)
mDNS_StopQuery(m, &ic->q);
mDNSPlatformDispatchAsync(m, ic, DeliverInsecureProofResultAsync);
}
mDNSlocal mDNSBool AlgorithmSupported(rdataDS *ds)
{
switch(ds->digestType)
{
case SHA1_DIGEST_TYPE:
case SHA256_DIGEST_TYPE:
break;
default:
LogDNSSEC("AlgorithmSupported: Unsupported digest %d", ds->digestType);
return mDNSfalse;
}
switch(ds->alg)
{
case CRYPTO_RSA_NSEC3_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_RSA_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_RSA_SHA256:
case CRYPTO_RSA_SHA512:
return mDNStrue;
default:
LogDNSSEC("AlgorithmSupported: Unsupported algorithm %d", ds->alg);
return mDNSfalse;
}
}
// Note: This function is called when DNSSEC results are delivered (from DeliverDNSSECStatus) and we can't deliver DNSSEC result
// again within this function as "m->ValidationQuestion" is already in use. Hence we should dispatch off the delivery of insecure
// results asynchronously.
//
// Insecure proof callback can deliver either insecure or bogus, but never secure result.
mDNSlocal void ProveInsecureCallback(mDNS *const m, DNSQuestion *question, const ResourceRecord *const answer, QC_result AddRecord)
{
InsecureContext *ic = (InsecureContext *)question->QuestionContext;
DNSSECVerifier *pdv = ic->dv;
AuthChain *ac;
(void) answer;
if (!AddRecord)
return;
mDNS_Lock(m);
if ((m->timenow - question->StopTime) >= 0)
{
mDNS_Unlock(m);
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Question %##s (%s) timed out", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
mDNS_Unlock(m);
// We only need to handle the actual DNSSEC results and the ones that are secure. Anything else results in
// bogus.
if (AddRecord != QC_dnssec)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Question %##s (%s), AddRecord %d, answer %s", question->qname.c,
DNSTypeName(question->qtype), AddRecord, RRDisplayString(m, answer));
return;
}
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: ic %p Question %##s (%s), DNSSEC status %s", ic, question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype),
DNSSECStatusName(question->ValidationStatus));
// Insecure is delivered for NSEC3 OptOut
if (question->ValidationStatus != DNSSEC_Secure && question->ValidationStatus != DNSSEC_Insecure)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Question %##s (%s) returned DNSSEC status %s", question->qname.c,
DNSTypeName(question->qtype), DNSSECStatusName(question->ValidationStatus));
goto done;
}
ac = (AuthChain *)question->DNSSECAuthInfo;
if (!ac)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: ac NULL for question %##s, %s", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
goto done;
}
if (!ac->rrset)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: ac->rrset NULL for question %##s, %s", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
goto done;
}
if (ac->rrset->rrtype != kDNSType_DS && ac->rrset->rrtype != kDNSType_NSEC && ac->rrset->rrtype != kDNSType_NSEC3)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: ac->rrset->rrtype %##s (%s) not handled", ac->rrset->name.c,
DNSTypeName(ac->rrset->rrtype));
goto done;
}
AuthChainLink(pdv, ac);
question->DNSSECAuthInfo = mDNSNULL;
if (ac->rrset->rrtype == kDNSType_DS)
{
rdataDS *ds = (rdataDS *)ac->rrset->rdata;
// If the delegation is secure, but the underlying zone is signed with an unsupported
// algorithm, then we can't verify it. Deliver insecure in that case.
if (!AlgorithmSupported(ds))
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Unsupported algorithm %d or digest %d", ds->alg, ds->digestType);
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Insecure);
return;
}
// If the delegation is secure and the name that we queried for is same as the original
// name that started the insecure proof, then something is not right. We started the
// insecure proof e.g., the zone is not signed, but we are able to validate a DS for
// the same name which implies that the zone is signed (whose algorithm we support) and
// we should not have started the insecurity proof in the first place.
if (SameDomainName(&question->qname, &pdv->origName))
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Insecure proof reached original name %##s, error", question->qname.c);
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Trying one more level down");
ProveInsecure(m, pdv, ic, mDNSNULL);
}
else if (ac->rrset->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC || ac->rrset->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC3)
{
CacheRecord *cr;
if (ac->rrset->rrtype == kDNSType_NSEC)
cr = NSECRecordIsDelegation(m, &question->qname, question->qtype);
else
cr = NSEC3RecordIsDelegation(m, &question->qname, question->qtype);
if (cr)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Non-existence proved and %s is a delegation for %##s (%s)", CRDisplayString(m, cr),
question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Insecure);
return;
}
// Could be a ENT. Go one more level down to see whether it is a secure delegation or not.
if (!SameDomainName(&question->qname, &pdv->origName))
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Not a delegation %##s (%s), go one more level down", question->qname.c, DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
ProveInsecure(m, pdv, ic, mDNSNULL);
}
else
{
// Secure denial of existence and the name matches the original query. This means we should have
// received an NSEC (if the type does not exist) or signed records (if the name and type exists)
// and verified it successfully instead of starting the insecure proof. This could happen e.g.,
// Wildcard expanded answer received without NSEC/NSEC3s etc. Also, is it possible that the
// zone went from unsigned to signed in a short time ? For now, we return bogus.
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecureCallback: Not a delegation %##s (%s), but reached original name", question->qname.c,
DNSTypeName(question->qtype));
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
}
}
return;
done:
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
}
// We return Insecure if we don't have a trust anchor or we have a trust anchor and
// can prove that the delegation is not secure (and hence can't establish the trust
// chain) or the delegation is possibly secure but we don't have the algorithm support
// to prove that.
mDNSexport void ProveInsecure(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, InsecureContext *ic, domainname *trigger)
{
TrustAnchor *ta;
domainname *sname;
if (ic == mDNSNULL)
{
ic = (InsecureContext *)mDNSPlatformMemAllocate(sizeof(InsecureContext));
if (!ic)
{
LogMsg("mDNSPlatformMemAllocate: ERROR!! memory alloc failed for ic");
return;
}
// Save the AuthInfo while we are proving insecure. We don't want to mix up
// the auth chain for Bogus and Insecure. If we prove it to be insecure, we
// will add the chain corresponding to the insecure proof. Otherwise, we will
// restore this chain.
if (dv->ac)
{
if (!dv->saveac)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: saving authinfo");
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: ERROR!! authinfo already set");
FreeDNSSECAuthChainInfo(dv->saveac);
}
dv->saveac = dv->ac;
ResetAuthChain(dv);
}
ic->dv = dv;
ic->q.ThisQInterval = -1;
if (trigger)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: Setting Trigger %##s", trigger->c);
ic->triggerLabelCount = CountLabels(trigger);
}
else
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: No Trigger");
ic->triggerLabelCount = CountLabels(&dv->origName);
}
ta = FindTrustAnchor(m, &dv->origName);
if (!ta)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: TrustAnchor NULL");
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Insecure);
return;
}
// We want to skip the labels that is already matched by the trust anchor so
// that the first query starts just below the trust anchor
ic->skip = CountLabels(&dv->origName) - CountLabels(&ta->zone);
if (!ic->skip)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: origName %##s, skip is zero", dv->origName.c);
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
}
// Look for the DS record starting just below the trust anchor.
//
// 1. If we find an NSEC record, then see if it is a delegation. If it is, then
// we are done. Otherwise, go down one more level.
//
// 2. If we find a DS record and no algorithm support, return "insecure". Otherwise, go
// down one more level.
//
sname = (domainname *)SkipLeadingLabels(&dv->origName, (ic->skip ? ic->skip - 1 : 0));
if (!sname)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: sname NULL, origName %##s, skip %d", dv->origName.c, ic->skip);
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
// Insecurity proof is started during the normal bottom-up validation when we have a break in the trust
// chain e.g., we get NSEC/NSEC3s when looking up a DS record. Insecurity proof is top-down looking
// for a break in the trust chain. If we have already tried the validation (before the insecurity
// proof started) for this "sname", then don't bother with the proof. This happens sometimes, when
// we can't prove whether a zone is insecurely delegated or not. For example, if we are looking up
// host1.secure-nods.secure.example and when we encounter secure-nods, there is no DS record in the
// parent. We start the insecurity proof remembering that "secure-nods.secure.example" is the trigger
// point. As part of the proof we reach "secure-nods.secure.example". Even though secure.example
// prove that the name "secure-nods.secure.example/DS" does not exist, it can't prove that it is a
// delegation. So, we continue one more level down to host1.secure-nods.secure.example and we
// realize that we already tried the validation and hence abort here.
if (CountLabels(sname) > ic->triggerLabelCount)
{
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: Beyond the trigger current name %##s, origName %##s", sname->c, dv->origName.c);
DeliverInsecureProofResult(m, ic, DNSSEC_Bogus);
return;
}
LogDNSSEC("ProveInsecure: OrigName %##s (%s), Current %##s", dv->origName.c, DNSTypeName(dv->origType), sname->c);
ic->skip--;
InitializeQuestion(m, &ic->q, dv->InterfaceID, sname, kDNSType_DS, ProveInsecureCallback, ic);
ic->q.ValidationRequired = DNSSEC_VALIDATION_INSECURE;
ic->q.ValidatingResponse = 0;
ic->q.DNSSECAuthInfo = mDNSNULL;
mDNS_StartQuery(m, &ic->q);
}
mDNSexport void BumpDNSSECStats(mDNS *const m, DNSSECStatsAction action, DNSSECStatsType type, mDNSu32 value)
{
switch (type)
{
case kStatsTypeMemoryUsage:
if (action == kStatsActionIncrement)
{
m->DNSSECStats.TotalMemUsed += value;
}
else if (action == kStatsActionDecrement)
{
m->DNSSECStats.TotalMemUsed -= value;
}
break;
case kStatsTypeLatency:
if (action == kStatsActionSet)
{
if (value <= 4)
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency0++;
}
else if (value <= 9)
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency5++;
}
else if (value <= 19)
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency10++;
}
else if (value <= 49)
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency20++;
}
else if (value <= 99)
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency50++;
}
else
{
m->DNSSECStats.Latency100++;
}
}
break;
case kStatsTypeExtraPackets:
if (action == kStatsActionSet)
{
if (value <= 2)
{
m->DNSSECStats.ExtraPackets0++;
}
else if (value <= 6)
{
m->DNSSECStats.ExtraPackets3++;
}
else if (value <= 9)
{
m->DNSSECStats.ExtraPackets7++;
}
else
{
m->DNSSECStats.ExtraPackets10++;
}
}
break;
case kStatsTypeStatus:
if (action == kStatsActionSet)
{
switch(value)
{
case DNSSEC_Secure:
m->DNSSECStats.SecureStatus++;
break;
case DNSSEC_Insecure:
m->DNSSECStats.InsecureStatus++;
break;
case DNSSEC_Indeterminate:
m->DNSSECStats.IndeterminateStatus++;
break;
case DNSSEC_Bogus:
m->DNSSECStats.BogusStatus++;
break;
case DNSSEC_NoResponse:
m->DNSSECStats.NoResponseStatus++;
break;
default:
LogMsg("BumpDNSSECStats: unknown status %d", value);
}
}
break;
case kStatsTypeMsgSize:
if (action == kStatsActionSet)
{
if (value <= 1024)
{
m->DNSSECStats.MsgSize0++;
}
else if (value <= 2048)
{
m->DNSSECStats.MsgSize1++;
}
else
{
m->DNSSECStats.MsgSize2++;
}
}
break;
case kStatsTypeProbe:
if (action == kStatsActionIncrement)
{
m->DNSSECStats.NumProbesSent += value;
}
break;
default:
LogMsg("BumpDNSSECStats: unknown type %d", type);
}
return;
}
#else // !DNSSEC_DISABLED
mDNSexport void VerifySignature(mDNS *const m, DNSSECVerifier *dv, DNSQuestion *q)
{
(void)m;
(void)dv;
(void)q;
}
mDNSexport void BumpDNSSECStats(mDNS *const m, DNSSECStatsAction action, DNSSECStatsType type, mDNSu32 value)
{
(void)m;
(void)action;
(void)type;
(void)value;
}
mDNSexport void InitializeQuestion(mDNS *const m, DNSQuestion *question, mDNSInterfaceID InterfaceID, const domainname *qname, mDNSu16 qtype, mDNSQuestionCallback *callback, void *context)
{
(void) m;
(void) question;
(void) InterfaceID;
(void) qname;
(void) qtype;
(void) callback;
(void) context;
}
mDNSexport char *DNSSECStatusName(DNSSECStatus status)
{
(void) status;
return mDNSNULL;
}
#endif // !DNSSEC_DISABLED
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